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A.Thesis abstract 
Abstract 
 
The Australian Baby Bonus offering parents $3,000 on the birth of a new child was 
announced on 11 May 2004. While the Baby Bonus has received academic attention,1 and 
ample media commentary on its implications and outcomes, there are no comprehensive 
studies to date that have considered whether the Baby Bonus has had a sustained effect on the 
national fertility rate, nor any that have attempted to disentangle the effects of policy from 
macroeconomic influences and underlying demographic trends in fertility choice in Australia 
during the same period.  
 
The availability of five years of birth data following the introduction of the Baby Bonus 
allows a more comprehensive analysis of the policy outcomes than is current in the literature. 
First, a significant increase in birth numbers 10 months following the announcement of the 
Baby Bonus is identified, and this overall increase was sustained up to the end of the 
observed period.  
 
Given the importance of separating policy effects from prevailing demographic trends such as 
postponement and subsequent recuperation, the analysis is extended to identify any 
heterogeneity across maternal age and parity2. 
  
                                                            
1 Anderson (2007); Balter (2006); Drago et al. (2011); Einarsdóttir et al. (2012); Gans & Leigh (2009); Gray at 
al. (2008); Heard (2010); Jackson and Casey (2009); Lain et al. (2009); Langridge et al. (2010); McDonald 
(2005); Parr and Guest (2011); Risse (2010); Sinclair et al. (2012). 
 
2
 The number of times a woman has given birth to a fetus with a gestational age of 24 weeks or more 
vi 
 
 Applying multivariate time series analysis to population data from the Victorian Perinatal 
birth data register VPDC (N = 1,671,774, T = 312), changes in the mean level and growth of 
age and order-specific birth ratios following the policy introduction are examined. All age 
groups except teenagers show a positive fertility change following the policy’s introduction. 
The results suggest that the policy may have elicited changes in fertility behaviour, evidenced 
by a higher growth in fertility of younger maternal age groups (from 20 to 29 years of age), 
which has been sustained past 2008, even as a growth in birth ratios of older cohorts was 
stabilising.  
 
An analysis of parity, across specific age groups suggests the observed change in fertility 
reflects permanent fertility increases over the period of study, rather than simply an 
adjustment of the timing of births. The analysis also controls for time-varying 
macroeconomic variables often put forward as an explanation for the increased fertility 
levels.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Background 
 
 
1.1 Thesis Overview 
 
The Australian population is ageing3  and as such is following the trend of other major 
industrialised economies. Declining mortality rates, coupled with sub-replacement fertility 
rates, simply means that over time the proportion of older people increases, while that of 
younger people of working age decreases. In developed regions, the number of children 
dropped below that of older people in 1998, and at the world level the number of older people 
is expected to exceed the number of young people in 2045 (Johnson-Hanks, Bachrach, 
Morgan, Kohler, 2011). Population ageing not only has obvious implications for pension 
schemes and health systems such as Medicare and the Pharmaceuticals Benefits Scheme 
(PBS),4 but it also has potential implications for economic growth, savings, investment, and 
human capital (Lee & Mason, 2011).  
 
The Australian Treasury released the first intergenerational report in 2002, which outlined the 
projected fiscal sustainability implications of demographic change and highlighted the need 
for governmental policy planning to address the challenges of structural ageing (Australian 
Treasury, 2002). The three ‘p’s: ‘population’, ‘participation’ and ‘productivity’ have since 
been used to guide public-policy development in this area (Australian Treasury & Swan, 
2010).  
                                                            
3
 The proportion of the population of people aged 65 years and over is projected to increase significantly by 
2056: from 13% in 2009 to between 23 and 25% in 2056. The proportion of those aged over 85 is expected to 
increase from 1.7% in 2009 to 4.9% in 2056 (based on Series B projections) (ABS, 2012). 
4
 Low fertility also has implications ‘for intergenerational equity, global economic competitiveness and relative 
global and cultural significance’ (Lutz & Skirbekk, 2005). 
2 
 
Although immigration and productivity gains can offset some of the effects of ageing, 
McDonald (2002) points out that when total fertility rates (TFR)5 fall below 1.6 the levels of 
migration needed for population replacement become impossibly large.  
 
In 2003, the Australian TFR was 1.75 and had been below the replacement level of 2.1 
children per women for 28 years. Low fertility rates may be a reflection of an inability to 
achieve desired family size due to an array of constraints, including those that are financially, 
work and partner related, as well fecundity,6 but not necessarily ‘for the lack of wanting kids’ 
(Weston, Qu, Parker & Alexander, 2004 p.1). It is estimated that if couples could achieve 
their desired fertility rate in Australia, the fertility rate would be at, or close to, the 
replacement level of 2.1 (Gray, Weston & Australian Institute of Family Studies, 2008; 
Holton, Fisher & Rowe, 2011). This gap between observed and desired fertility, coupled with 
governmental concerns about structural ageing, provides some rationale for the introduction 
of a birth subsidy policy (Chesnais, 2000).  
 
In response to these low fertility levels, in May 2004, the Australian Government announced 
the introduction of a universal cash payment, the Baby Bonus. Although not explicitly 
presented as a pronatalist policy, as ‘it is not the role of Governments to tell citizens how 
many children they should have’ (Australian Treasury, 2004 Appendix), the introduction of 
the policy was accompanied by the often-quoted pronatalist rhetoric by then Treasurer Peter 
Costello, to ‘have one for the father, one for the mother and one for the country … If you 
want to fix the ageing demographic, that’s what you do’ (Faroque, 2004). The implicit 
intention of the policy to increase fertility rates is reiterated by the government 
acknowledgement in the 2005 United Nations world population policies report (Department 
                                                            
5
 The TFR is the number of children a woman would have if she were subject to prevailing fertility rates at all 
ages in a single given year and survived throughout all her childbearing years. 
6
 ‘Fecundity’ refers to the natural probability of a birth. 
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of Economic and Social Affairs [DESA], 2006), that fertility was considered too low and 
policies were in place to raise it. 
 
There have been a number of adjustments to the policy since its inception. Initially, the 
federal government pledged a lump-sum payment of $3,000 for each child born after 30 June 
2004. This amount was subsequently increased in July 2006 and July 2008 to $4,000 and 
$5,000 respectively.  A significant change also occurred on 1 January 2009. The Baby Bonus 
was means tested and payable in 13 equal instalments if the total family income equalled 
$75,000 or less in the first 6 months following the birth of the child. From January 2011, a 
paid parental leave scheme was introduced, providing more generous support to working 
parents of up to 18 weeks’ pay at the minimum wage. To be eligible for PPL, the parent 
needs to meet a work test and have a taxable income of $150,000 or less in the year prior to 
the birth/adoption (Klapdor, 2013). 
 
Recent changes beyond the empirical scope of this thesis, but which highlight the timeliness 
of the investigation, include a reduction of the payment to $3,000 for a second (or 
subsequent) birth7 and most recently, its proposed removal on 1 March 2014.8  
 
Economists have conceptualised fertility decisions as a utility maximisation problem (Arroyo 
and Zhang, 1997; Becker, 1991; Hotz, Klerman & Willis, 1993). Simply, a universal subsidy 
to lower the cost or ‘price’ of children would be expected to increase the demand for children 
by reducing barriers to fertility, and this would be reflected in higher birth numbers. Positive 
social interaction and social multiplier effects generated by the initial impulse of the policy 
                                                            
7
 Implemented from 1 July 2013. 
8
 Under the Family Assistance and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2013, schedule 2A, the Baby Bonus will 
be replaced with an additional Family Tax Benefit Part A payment of $2,000 for the first child (income of less 
than $101,000) and $1,000 for subsequent children (income of less than $112,000).  
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can also affect fertility behaviour and therefore, observed birth ratios (Becker & Murphy, 
2003). Hakim (2003) points out that the universal nature of the policy is important, as it needs 
to benefit both working and non-working mothers to be effective. However, it may be that 
heterogeneity of female preferences with respect to choices between market and non-market 
activities would result in a heterogeneous response to the policy across women (Hakim, 
2003).  
 
While demographers acknowledge the difficulty of forecasting future fertility trends, the pre-
2004 literature does not suggest that the TFR was expected to rise or move closer to 
replacement (McDonald, 2000). Australia has observed an increase in TFR, and while the 
period fertility measure, the TFR, is not yet at the replacement level of 2.1, fertility rates have 
increased from 1.75 children per woman in 2003 to 1.9 in 2010. 
 
1.2 Aims and Objectives of This Thesis 
 
The central objective of this thesis is to examine the nature of the fertility response of 
Australian families to the financial incentive of the Baby Bonus. The efficacy of the policy in 
determining a change in both fertility and the timing of births is assessed by exploring the 
time series properties of national and Victorian fertility measures, while controlling for other 
possible determinants of fertility choice. 
  
5 
 
 
Policies that change incentives to childbearing can induce a number of fertility outcomes, 
which are summarised below: 
• First, a birth subsidy may increase quantum or the level of fertility 
• Secondly, a birth subsidy can alter the timing of births, inducing ‘tempo’ effects such 
as recuperation or anticipation9  
• In addition, a discretionary birth-timing effect or ‘introduction effect’ may be induced 
where, when possible, parents move birth dates to be eligible for the policy payment 
(Gans & Leigh, 2009). 
 
Fertility change patterns are explored on an aggregate level nationally and subsequently 
extended to include maternal age and birth-order characteristics across the Victorian 
population. The research to date on the effects of the policy has tended to focus on 
discretionary birth-timing effects (Gans & Leigh, 2009) or fertility intentions using 
Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) data (Drago, Sawyer, 
Shreffler, Warren & Wooden, 2011; Parr & Guest, 2011; Risse, 2010). While there has been 
an examination of the policy effect across maternal age and birth order in New South Wales 
(NSW) (Lain et al., 2009) and Western Australia (Einarsdóttir et al., 2012; Langridge, 
Nassar, Li, Jacoby & Stanley, 2010), this has been from a perspective of the implications for 
public health and resources, and none of the studies control for alternative explanations of 
fertility growth such as fluctuations in key macroeconomic indicators or underlying 
demographic trends. To date there is no comprehensive study of the effect of the Baby Bonus 
incentives on Victorian families’ fertility choices.  
                                                            
9
 The quantum level of fertility refers to the number of children people have on average while tempo effects 
refer to the age pattern of fertility. Period fertility measures often reflect an interplay between quantum and 
tempo fertility (Sobotka, 2003). 
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Policy evaluation is complicated by a number of factors such as contemporaneous changes in 
underlying demographic, social and economic trends. Demographic trends such as the 
influence of childbearing ‘postponement’ to later maternal ages, and the intensity of 
subsequent ‘recuperation’ have implications for period fertility measurement (Ní Bhrolcháin, 
2011; Sobotka, Zeman, Lesthaeghe & Frejka, 2012). Tempo effects denote a change in the 
mean age of childbearing from one period to the next. For example, ‘recuperation’ represents 
more women having births at older ages due to earlier ‘postponement’, whereas ‘anticipation’ 
is the bringing forward of births that a women would have had later.10 Delayed childbearing 
will temporarily depress the period TFR measure, while a return to younger childbearing 
would increase the TFR. Tempo effects can be differentiated from quantum fertility changes 
that capture changes in cohort completed fertility.  
 
Therefore, the research challenge is to distinguish policy-induced fertility outcomes from 
underlying changes in childbearing trends. Fertility choice may also be sensitive to time-
varying fluctuations in macroeconomic indicators, household expectations and key associated 
costs. 
The key contributions that this research makes to the literature are as follows: 
• -This research provides a comprehensive analysis of the Baby Bonus policy on 
subsequent fertility behaviours in Australia with specific emphasis on Victoria. The 
analysis considers both demographic and economic trends in the policy evaluation  
• Potential policy effects are often dismissed as demographic trends such as 
postponement and recuperation. Through analysis of the fertility response across 
                                                            
10
 Please see Bongaarts and Sobotka, (2012); and Bongaarts and Watkins, (1996) for a detailed discussion on 
tempo and quantum fertility measures.  
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maternal age and parity this research questions if the observed increases in fertility is 
due to the momentum of previous fertility behaviour change  
• Macroeconomic and labour market trends are known fertility determinants and to 
examine the policy effect the sensitivities of fertility choice to changes in aggregate 
economic circumstance are controlled for.   
• Fertility Dynamics are examined to identify if fertility changes after the introduction 
of the Baby Bonus policy are a result of changes in the timing of births or reflect 
increases in the total level of births 
 
1.3 Methodology Applied 
 
The policy response, relative to contemporaneous demographic and economic trends, is 
evaluated using structural time series analysis on both national monthly birth rates and 
Victorian perinatal data (VDPC) disaggregated across maternal age and birth order.11  A 
flexible modelling approach is applied to help capture the structural dynamics of fertility 
patterns at the national level, which subsequently inform the interventions imposed for the 
Victorian case study.  
 
Time series analysis allows policy contemporaneous fertility change interventions to be 
quantified, while at the same time controlling for other potential determinants of fertility that 
could affect the dynamics of relevant birth ratios. It is acknowledged that time series analysis 
faces limitations in identifying causal relationships. However, the use of population-level 
data for both Australian and Victorian births, enables a comprehensive societal-level policy 
response to be assessed.  
 
                                                            
11
 VPDC data were sourced subject to RMIT ethics clearances and approval by the CCOPMM. 
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1.4 Background 
 
Australia has a long history of provision of fertility-related payments. As early as 1912, five 
pounds was paid for each child under the Maternity Allowance Act 1912.12 More recently, 
and indeed a precursor to the payment currently known as the Baby Bonus, was the First 
Child Tax Refund introduced in July 2001. This payment provided a refund to mothers on 
income tax paid in the year prior to giving birth. The payment applied only to the birth of a 
first child and was claimed on tax assessment, paying up to a maximum of $2,500 per year 
over five years if the mother remained out of the labour force. This was in addition to a 
separate maternity allowance payment per birth of $840 (Department of Families, Housing, 
Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [FaHCSIA], 2006). This First Child Tax Refund 
policy was criticised as ineffective, and had an array of potentially undesirable incentive 
properties (Anderson, 2007; Gans & Leigh, 2009). Apps (2001) goes further to say that ‘this 
kind of family policy shifts the tax burden disproportionately to working married mothers in 
low and median wage families. The outcome of this, in the short term, is to reduce 
employment and family savings. In the longer term, it undermines economic growth, reduces 
fertility and creates a more unequal society’ (Apps, 2001 p.1). 
 
In May 2004, the ‘new’ maternity payment, more commonly referred to as the Baby Bonus, 
was announced .13 The implicit aim of the policy was to affect fertility decision making at the 
margin, assuming the existence of a ‘fertility gap’. It operated very simply: from the 1st July 
2004, each family received a cash payment of $3,000 on the birth of a child. Unlike its 
predecessor, the Baby Bonus scored highly against a range of social policy principles 
                                                            
12
 Please see: http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C1943A00016/Amends. 
13
 The policy was only officially known as the Baby Bonus from 2007, for the sake of simplicity, this thesis uses 
the term ‘Baby Bonus’ to refer to the policy introduced in July 2004. 
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(McDonald, 2008). A direct payment was seen to affirm that society values children. It also 
satisfied a horizontal equity criterion, was neutral in relation to the working circumstances of 
parents, and was simple and transparent. Parents immediately knew what they were entitled 
to without having to make complex calculations.  
 
Table 1.1: Timeline Related to the Baby Bonus Policy  
11 May 2004  The date of announcement of the introduction of the Baby Bonus. 
1 July 2004 01/07/2004 $3,000.00 
20/09/2004 $3,042.00 
20/03/2005 $3,079.00 
20/09/2005 $3,119.00 
20/03/2006 $3,166.00 
 
1 July 2006 
The Baby Bonus increased to $4,000 (indexed to inflation). 
01/07/2006 $4,000.00 
20/09/2006 $4,100.00 
20/03/2007 $4,133.00 
 
1 January 2007  
All mothers under the age of 18 received the payment in 13 equal 
instalments. 
01/07/2007 $4,133.00 
20/09/2007 $4,187.00 
20/03/2008 $4,258.00 
 
1 July 2008  
The Baby Bonus increased to $5,000, paid in 13 equal instalments 
to those younger than 18 years of age and a means-tested ceiling of 
combined annual income of $150,000 or $75,000 in the 6 months 
post the birth of the child. 
From 1 July 2008, the Baby Bonus is indexed once per year. 
1 July 2009  Means-tested Baby Bonus paid to all families in 13 equal instalments. 
Source: FaHCSIA (2012). 
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1.5 Thesis Organisation and Structure 
 
Fluctuations in birth rates may be related to a combination of factors, including policies that 
reduce financial barriers to fertility, as well as a slowing of postponement, or changes in 
economic growth patterns. In this section, the structure of the thesis and the evolution of the 
empirical chapters employed to explore the efficacy of the Australian Baby Bonus on 
Australian and Victorian fertility rates are presented. 
 
1.5.1 Review of the Related Literature (Chapter 2) 
 
The effect of changed incentives on childbearing is evaluated in this thesis and as such, the 
topic under investigation spans both economic and demographic literature. An overview of 
the economic and demographic literature relevant to the possible effect of cash incentives on 
fertility choice is presented in this chapter. The economic and social theoretical 
underpinnings of the policy and expected outcomes are discussed, while relevant empirical 
studies of the fertility effect of cash payments in Australia and internationally are analysed. 
As the research focuses on providing a policy evaluation, it is necessary to understand and 
control for non-policy related determinants of fertility that have a time-varying nature. In 
light of the global financial crisis and subsequent recessionary effects in Europe and the 
United States, there has been renewed interest in the effect of macroeconomic conditions and 
economic uncertainty on fertility choice; the more recent empirical literature dealing with this 
theme is reviewed.  
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1.5.2 Methodology Overview (Chapter 3) 
 
A non-technical overview of the methodology used to evaluate the policy is presented in this 
chapter. It begins with a presentation of the research questions developed in light of the 
literature review. The principal thesis objective is to examine the efficacy of the Baby Bonus 
policy in determining a change in both fertility and the timing of births. To answer this 
question, other possible determinants of fertility choice need to be controlled for; thus, each 
subsequent research question supports the principal thesis objective. The rationale for the 
four-stage empirical strategy used to assess the efficacy of the Baby Bonus policy is 
presented. Further, a brief introduction to structural time series models and their advantages 
and limitations are discussed. The nature of, and rationale for, the fertility change date 
intervention and explanatory variables applied in three of the four empirical chapters are also 
presented here.  
 
1.5.3 An Appraisal of Baby Bonus Effect on National Fertility (Chapter 4) 
 
This chapter presents the first of three empirical chapters, the focus of which is to identify 
whether there has been a positive fertility response to the introduction of the policy at a 
national level, and whether this response has been sustained over time. Purely tempo effects 
would be demonstrated by an increase in birth ratios followed by a corresponding decline as 
families changed the timing of their children, rather than family size.  
 
To identify whether there has been a significant and sustained increase in birth ratios post the 
Baby Bonus policy introduction relative to the pre-policy trend, 19 years of Australian birth 
and macroeconomic data are analysed using an unobserved components model.  
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It is acknowledged that while five-years-post-policy data are not sufficient to capture all 
possible tempo effects, one would still expect to see some fertility patterns emerge in the data 
within this timeframe.  
 
Fertility responses are explored by identifying significant changes in the pattern of the data 
post the policy introduction, while also considering the influence of macroeconomic trends 
on birth ratios. A flexible modelling approach is used to inform the timing and type of the 
trend intervention variables. An estimate of the number of births attributable to the Baby 
Bonus until September 2009 is presented.  
 
Separate to policy related fertility effects, Gans and Leigh’s (2007; 2009) findings suggest the 
introduction of the Baby Bonus induced some discretionary change in the timing of births by 
women expecting a baby close to the commencement of the policy to ensure eligibility for the 
payment. The analysis presented in this chapter considers whether these discretionary birth-
timing effects are evident at the introduction of the policy and for subsequent changes in 
payment size and structure.  
 
1.5.4 Heterogeneity of Response to the Baby Bonus across Maternal Age: A Victorian 
Case Study (Chapter 5) 
 
The observed increase in the TFR in the years following the Baby Bonus policy introduction 
has previously been attributed to a co-incidental recuperation of postponed births (Heard, 
2010; Parr & Guest, 2011). The focus of this chapter is to analyse the policy response across 
maternal age levels with the aim of separating policy effects from prevailing demographic 
trends. Where behaviour is not changing in response to policy, fertility changes may be 
limited to age-specific effects driven by the momentum of past changes in behaviour.  
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The maternal-age-specific responses to the incentives of the Baby Bonus are explored using 
Victorian population data from 1983 to 2009, sourced from the Victorian Perinatal Data 
Collection (VPDC)14 and analysed using multivariate structural time series modelling, known 
as seemingly unrelated time series equations (SUTSE) (Harvey, 1991; Koopman, Harvey 
Doornik,& Shephard 2009). This is a multivariate extension of the model presented in 
chapter four. Significant fertility changes identified at the national level in March 2005, 
January 2006 and January 2008 inform the interventions imposed on Victorian data. This 
approach can measure structural changes in the relevant age-specific birth rates (ASBR’s) 
series15 after the policy introduction, while controlling for other possible determinants of 
fertility choice. While there are limitations on the ability of time series analysis to isolate 
causal relationships, a consideration of changes in the relevant ASBR’s does assist in 
separating policy effects from prevailing demographic trends such as recuperation of 
previously postponed births (Bongaarts & Sobotka, 2012).  
 
1.5.5 ‘One for the Country’: The Victorian Case Study (Chapter 6) 
 
One question that remains unaddressed from the maternal-age analysis in the preceding 
chapter is whether the fertility change patterns indicate a sustained increase in fertility or 
simply a fertility timing or tempo effect. The policy assessment presented in Chapter 5 is 
extended in this chapter to include an analysis by maternal age and birth order.  
 
Identifying significant changes in birth order trends can help to clarify the policy effects in 
two ways. 
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 Please see http://www.health.vic.gov.au/ccopmm/vpdc/index.htm. 
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 The ASBR refers to the number of births for women in age group i /number of women in age group i) x 1000. 
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 First, a significant increase in higher order births (i.e. three or greater) would suggest that the 
policy induced family expansion in which families may have had an additional child that they 
would not have had in the absence of the policy. Having a first child at an earlier age can be 
predictive of higher completed fertility, and so a possible policy-induced fertility change in 
the patterns of first births can suggest longer term changes to fertility patterns. Second, 
specific birth-order effects can assist in identifying tempo effects, for example, bringing 
forward a given birth would be matched by a decline in the same age cohort at a later stage if 
purely tempo effects are present.  
 
Victorian Perinatal Data Collection (VPDC) data are used to distinguish the policy response 
across maternal age characteristics and birth order. Multivariate structural time series models 
are applied for each birth order (1–5) for all maternal ages, and subsequently for each birth 
order across maternal age. In addition, a series of models are estimated with the inclusion of 
explanatory variables capturing economic and labour-market trends.  
 
1.5.6 Contributions and Conclusion (Chapter 7) 
 
Here key findings are summarised. The contributions of the research are outlined and policy 
implications drawn from the findings are discussed. This chapter concludes with a discussion 
of the limitations of the scope of the thesis and an agenda for future research.  
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Chapter 2: Review of the Related Literature  
 
 
There is extensive literature in both economics and demography that considers the effect of 
cash subsidies on fertility behaviour. Initially, the literature relevant to the maternity payment 
or Baby Bonus is reviewed. Subsequently, empirical investigations of the fertility effect of 
financial transfers with pronatalist intent both domestically and internationally are discussed. 
Finally, the relevance of the macroeconomic and demographic context on fertility patterns is 
considered.  
 
2.1 Theoretical Background: Incentives and Fertility Choice 
 
While microeconomic theory predicts that cash subsidies would increase fertility, the family 
economics literature suggests a complex array of interactions and transmission mechanisms. 
Much of the economic theory of fertility within the rational-choice framework originates 
from the works of Becker (1960, 1991) and Leibenstein (1957). Fertility behaviour can be 
analysed within a choice theoretic framework wherein family size (given preferences) is the 
result of variations in income and the ‘costs’ inclusive of the opportunity cost of children 
(Hotz et al., 1993). The cost variable incorporates the theory of the allocation of time, the 
concepts of household-production theory and human-capital-investment theory. Given that 
the rearing of children is considered time intensive relative to other household production, the 
cost of childbearing (and childrearing) is in the most part a function of the value of a 
mother’s time. The interaction of these variables is complex in the context of fertility choice, 
for example, rising female labour-participation rates, less gender specialisation, and higher 
human-capital investment and wages for women represent rising family incomes yet a higher 
16 
 
opportunity cost to childbearing.16 The direct cost and the opportunity cost may depend on 
the date of birth or vary over time due to policies that negate the direct cost, the economic 
environment and the potential for economies of scale, depending on the timing of births of 
other children (Barmby & Cigno, 1990). 
 
Recent developments in the family economics literature have also highlighted the role of the 
social climate and social interactions on fertility choice. The rational-choice model of fertility 
has been extended to include social interaction on the basis that individuals use the situational 
information available to them. Becker and Murphy (2003) suggest that ‘the number and 
education of children are affected by the behaviour of friends, peers and neighbours … births 
within a group could respond sharply to small changes in explanatory variables because the 
social multiplier magnifies the responses of the members of the same social group’ (p. 21). 
Economic models have been developed to study ‘socially-embedded’ fertility behaviour, for 
example, Kohler (2001). Durlauf and Walker (1999) suggest that endogenous social effects 
generate social multipliers when the total effect of an individual’s decision on the overall 
population behaviour is larger than the initial direct effect of their choice. For example, a 
couple may respond directly to the financial incentive of the policy, yet may communicate 
positive experiences of childbearing to friends and colleagues, and through social learning, 
induce other couples to consider childbearing. Bikhchandra, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) 
advocate that the theory of observational learning is powerful, and that the actions of one set 
of decision makers often influences the reactions of others.  
 
There is a great deal of empirical literature on the significant links between cultural and 
family background and fertility, (for example Bernardi, 2003; Fernández & Fogli, 2006; 
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 Ahn and Mira (2002) find the correlation between TFR and female labour-force participation changed sign 
since the late 1980s where thereafter, female labour-force participation has a positive effect on fertility (Ahn & 
Mira, 2002). 
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Kotte, 2012). In addition, Lyngstad and Prskawetz (2010) and Balbo (2012) highlight the 
significance of family, peer and neighbourhood effects on fertility. Indeed, Bongaarts and 
Watkins (1996) in their analysis of demographic transition, acknowledge the importance of 
socioeconomic factors that change the relative costs of children but they stress the importance 
of social interaction, which ‘can become a powerful force’ in influencing fertility behaviour. 
More recently, Fent, Aparicio Diaz and Prskawetz (2010) take into account societal structure 
when assessing the fertility effect of family policies and find that social networks have a 
significant role on the impact of family policies. 
 
This literature suggests that increased fertility can generate increased momentum to further 
increases in fertility.17 Using the theory of planned behaviour, the work of Dommermuth, 
Klobas and Lappegård (2011) explore how people make decisions about the timing of 
children. They investigate the role of attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioural 
control on fertility intention, and the results suggest that subjective norms have a significant 
effect on the timing of intentions to have a child (Dommermuth et al., 2011). 
 
The intricacies and complexities of these interactions and their associated transmission 
mechanisms are not the subject of this thesis; however, they do explain how a policy such as 
the Baby Bonus, which may have a moderate direct effect on fertility may act as a catalyst to 
generate stronger fertility momentum.  
 
Hakim’s (2000) preference theory assumes that women are heterogeneous in their lifestyle 
preference and therefore, any fertility policy must be appealing to women with diverse 
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 Consider also the converse to Lutz and Skirbekk’s (2005) ‘low fertility trap’, wherein low fertility rates in the 
near term generate a force of negative momentum for the longer term. 
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preferences between family work and market work (Hakim, 2000). 18  Heterogeneity of 
preferences for children means different interpretations of the costs and benefits and a 
likelihood of a differential response to fertility subsidies such as the Baby Bonus. Women are 
heterogeneous and therefore, so are their responses to changes in economic factors or policy 
changes (Hakim, 2003).19  
 
Gauthier (2008) stresses the importance of addressing the issue of heterogeneity in 
populations and identifying which of these ‘subgroups may be most influenced by policies’ 
(Gauthier 2008 p. 28). A project funded by the European Commission, the Reproductive 
Decision Making in a Macro-micro Perspective Project (REPRO), provides a comprehensive 
analysis of fertility decision making from both a micro and macro perspective. The REPRO20 
project focuses on the reproductive decision making of individuals within the context of an 
influential macro environment and explores reasons for the existence of a fertility gap. On a 
macro level, European fertility trends were examined in the context of economic and social 
indicators. On a micro level, the theory of planned behaviour is used to analyse the process of 
reproductive decision making. One key finding of the project was that the formations of 
intentions to have a child differ in complex manners across age and parity. In particular, the 
realisation of intentions to have a first child differ from that of any higher order births, as a 
first child signifies a transition to parenthood, a crucial transition in life that represents major 
lifestyle changes. In addition, findings suggest that the intentions of younger respondents are 
less likely to be realised, given the realities of competing forces with childbearing such as 
completion of education, career building and securing access to family-friendly housing 
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 Hakim identified three types of women: those who are family orientated, career focused and in between (those 
‘adaptive’ women who try to maximise work and family). 
19
 Fan and Maitra (2011) tested that the hypothesis that the baby bonus could transmit to higher fertility by 
increasing the bargaining power of the household member that has the highest fertility preference. Their 
findings did not support any positive fertility effects of the Baby Bonus. 
20
 Please see Sobotka (2011); and Testa et al. (2011) for a comprehensive review of the research output from 
REPRO, a European-focused multidisciplinary project.  
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(Philipov, Thévenon, Klobas, Bernardi & Liefbroer, 2009). Therefore, the identification of 
the age-specific and parity-specific fertility response to the Baby Bonus in the Australian 
context is an important addition to the literature. 
 
2.2 International Empirical Literature 
 
Previous studies suggest that a pronatalist policy can have a positive effect on fertility, 
although the cost tends to be high. Much of the international empirical literature relates to 
packages of family policies that may be inclusive of, but not limited to, direct cash subsidies 
such as the Baby Bonus. A review of empirical evidence linking family policies and fertility 
by Gauthier (2007) generally finds small positive effects on fertility. Gauthier points out the 
complexity of the fertility decision-making process and the resulting need to isolate the 
effects of policies from other possible determinants. Indeed, a more recent paper by 
Thévenon and Gauthier (2011) suggests that the effects of policies on fertility are often 
underestimated due to the difficulty in assessing the long-term effects.  
 
Thévenon and Luci (2012) identify a positive effect of cash benefits in the year after 
childbirth when considering the policy of 18 Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries from 1982 to 2007. Both TFR and tempo adjusted fertility 
rates are dependent variables in this analysis and results are robust for both. They also 
identify that fertility reacts in a time-delayed manner to the changes in the policy 
environment. An often-cited paper by Gauthier and Hatzius (1997) simultaneously considers 
cash benefits and maternity leave. The dependent variable they used is the log of total 
fertility, using data from 22 industrialised countries from 1970 to 1990. Their analysis found 
the decision to bear a child was affected by ‘its direct cost which is lowered by the 
government subsidy, but not by the opportunity costs involved in taking time off work’ 
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(Gauthier & Hatzius, 1997 p. 300). They also found that increasing assistance for the first 
child had a greater effect on fertility than for subsequent children. An earlier paper by Buttner 
and Lutz (1990) examines the effect on fertility of a pronatalist policy in the German 
Democratic Republic in 1976—a policy aimed at obtaining replacement fertility in the longer 
term. The dependent variables used in this case are age-specific fertility rates and a 
comparison of fertility rates pre and post the policy indicate a positive fertility response to the 
policy.  
 
The United Kingdom’s welfare reforms introduced in 1999 are the subject of Brewer 
Ratcliffe and Smith (2010) analysis of policy effects on fertility. Between 1999 and 2003, 
government spending per child increased by 50% in real terms, wherein effects were 
concentrated on lower income households. They identify evidence for a pro-fertility effect of 
the welfare reforms and find that this is strongest for first births, rather than subsequent 
births. The connections between financial incentives and fertility in Israel are explored by 
Cohen, Dehejia and Romanov (2007). Constructing an individual-level panel data set over the 
period 1999 to 2005, they test the price effect of child subsidy changes (i.e. a reduction in 
2003). The subsidy changes were most significant for third and higher parity children and 
their analysis suggests that policies that lower the marginal price of a child are effective in 
raising fertility over a short time horizon (Cohen et al., 2007). Laroque and Salanié (2008), 
using French data, find that fertility is sensitive to financial incentives for the first and third 
births but not for the second birth. Other positive policy effects were identified by Castles’ 
(2003) and d’Addio and d’Ercole’s (2005) analyses of TFR across OECD countries, finding 
that fertility rates are higher where direct costs of children are lower. 
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A policy implemented in the Canadian province of Quebec between 1986 and 1997 that paid 
families up to $8,000 for having a child,21 provides a natural experiment in fertility choice 
and has been the topic of a number of empirical studies. This policy probably most closely 
resembles the Baby Bonus, although unlike the Australian policy the cash payment increased 
across parities. Milligan (2005) finds evidence that the policy in Quebec achieved its goal of 
increasing fertility and attributes 93,000 births to the policy over the ten-year period. In 
addition, Milligan (2005) finds that higher income is associated with a larger fertility effect 
for cash payments.22 Preceding Milligan (2005), Duclos, Lefebvre and Merrigan (2001) used 
a difference in difference estimator to identify the effect of the Quebec Allowance for 
Newborn Children. They find that generous family benefits have an effect on fertility rates, in 
particular because they provide a strong incentive to give birth to a third child in Quebec. 
Positive effects of financial transfers on higher order births are also supported in a study of 
fertility trends in the northern Italian region of Fruilia-Venezia Giulia, which introduced a 
bonus at birth to address low fertility, the payment of which was differentiated by marital 
status, citizenship and birth order, with higher payments for successive children. Boccuzzo  
(2008) finds the payment increased higher order births in the region, particularly for low-
income women who already had two or more children. 
 
2.3 Australian Empirical Literature 
 
The Australian Baby Bonus scheme has also received significant attention in research since 
its inception in 2004. Much of the economic analysis of the Australian Baby Bonus has been 
focused on discretionary birth-timing effects, fertility intentions, or state-specific effects.  
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 The Canadian Allowance for Newborn Children gave a payment of $500 for a first child and up to $8,000 for 
a third. 
22
 This is consistent with the experience of the Baby Bonus in Western Australia; see Landgridge (2010), which 
is discussed below. 
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For example, Gans and Leigh (2009) analyse the discretionary birth-timing effects of the 
introduction of the policy. They used daily birth numbers from 1975 to 2004, focusing on the 
days immediately preceding and following 1 July of each year. Using standard regression 
techniques, they conclude that up to 1,000 births (primarily discretionary Caesarean section 
births) may have been delayed as a result of the introduction of the Baby Bonus. In a similar 
analysis of the 2006 Baby Bonus increase, they conclude that approximately 600 births were 
delayed in this instance (Gans & Leigh, 2007). This analysis of policy changes on the 
discretionary timing of births has stimulated research relating to a policy introduction in 
Germany (Tamm, 2009) and Kuhn and Brunner’s (2011) study that focuses on the cancelling 
of a policy in Austria. 
 
Drago et al. (2011) utilise the HILDA23 household panel data to assess whether the Baby 
Bonus increased fertility intentions and thereby births, and whether the effects were 
temporary or sustained. They investigate whether the effects were concentrated among 
particular income groups and those women who already had children. A simultaneous-
equations approach was used, with fertility intentions treated as endogenous in a model 
predicting births; thus, testing the effect of the Baby Bonus on fertility intentions. Their 
analysis includes variables that capture the opportunity cost of birth such as labour force 
status, education and income. They find that fertility intentions rose after the announcement 
of the Baby Bonus, and the birth rate was estimated to have risen modestly as a result.  
 
Risse (2010), also analysing HILDA household panel data, examines the effect of the Baby 
Bonus on household fertility intentions. The results suggest a significant increase in 
childbearing intentions, which is strongest among low-income households.  
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 Please see Wooden and Watson (2006) for a detailed description of HILDA. 
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Conversely, an analysis of the policy effect in Western Australia was conducted by Langridge 
et al. (2010), and although they find a positive increase in fertility, this was particularly in 
women residing in higher socioeconomic areas. A related study by Einarsdóttir et al. (2012), 
analysing average quarterly birth rates, estimates that birth rates increased 12.8% following 
the introduction of the Baby Bonus. They find the greatest deviations in trends post the policy 
introduction were to young women aged 20 to 24 years and to women having their third and 
fourth child. 
 
Lain et al. (2009) use a Poisson regression analysis of NSW birth numbers and the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (ABS) population estimates to assess the effect of the Baby Bonus on 
birth rates. They analyse the change in the birth rates in 2005 and 2006, relative to the trend 
before the introduction of the bonus and find that birth rates increased, especially among 
women having their second or subsequent child. A further study by Lain et al. (2010) 
evaluates the effect of the Baby Bonus on NSW health services and estimates an additional 
11,283 births per year in NSW due to the Baby Bonus, at a cost to the healthcare system of an 
additional $60 million in 2008 (Lain et al., 2010).24 
 
While the aforementioned research demonstrates empirical evidence of a positive effect on 
fertility, a paper by Parr and Guest (2011) raises questions about the co-incidence of 
Australia’s observed fertility increase and policy initiatives. The authors attempt to 
disaggregate family policy effects from socio demographic trends and stress that Australia’s 
increase in not unique in context of other OECD countries. They suggest that the contribution 
of the Baby Bonus to increased fertility has been small and that a range of socio demographic 
variables such as the interaction of age and parity, primarily structural tempo distortions, but 
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 Negative binomial regression was used on data from 1998 to 2004 to generate a predicted number of births in 
2008. The predicted number was then compared with observed numbers to identify a deviation from the pre 
Baby Bonus trend.  
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also education, marital status, income and occupation were affecting fertility more 
significantly.  
 
Heard (2010) is also cautious of interpretations of increased TFR25 post 2004 as evidence of a 
successful Australian pronatalist policy. She points out the difficulty in separating the policy 
effects from other environmental factors but concedes that the policy setting may be a 
contributing factor to recent fertility increases. She also reiterates the possible distortions of 
the TFR due to changes in the timing of childbirth or tempo effects such as postponement, 
recuperation and anticipation.  
 
A prevalent demographic trend in most OECD countries, including Australia, has been that of 
postponement of childbearing to later years and has been labelled by some demographers as 
postponement transition (Van De Kaa, 1987; Sobotka et al., 2012).26 This is characterised by 
an absolute fertility decline at younger ages and the relative recuperation at older age, subject 
to biological limitations. Both Heard (2010) and Parr and Guest (2011) attribute some of the 
increased TFR to a slowing down of postponement.  
 
2.4 Birth Timing and Fertility Measurement  
 
Analysts are divided on whether period factors such as economic fluctuations, policy changes 
and social factors, are the principal determinants of fertility or whether cohort effects are 
driving fertility change. Ni Bhrolchain (1992) points out that although cohort fertility is what 
analysts aim to estimate, period figures provide an imperfect guide to it and provide a useful 
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 The TFR is the predominant measurement used in general discussions of fertility and represents the number of 
children a woman would have if she were subject to prevailing fertility rates at all ages from a single given year. 
TFR = the sum of the ASBR x the number of years in each age group ÷ 1000. 
26
 For discussion on demographic transition see Becker and Barro (1988); Easterlin (1975); Mason (1997); and 
Mason and Jensen (1995). 
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measure of the current population’s fertility patterns. Debate continues about the best 
strategies for the management of tempo effects in period fertility measures. Bongaarts and 
Feeney (1998) have developed a period measure that controls for tempo distortions; however, 
birth intervals are required in this case and these data are generally not freely available, which 
limits it application. Ni Bhrolchain advocates a period measure of fertility, but one that takes 
account of parity and is age specific to enable past histories to be considered. Parity27 
statistics can help to determine whether changes in period fertility measures represent purely 
tempo effects. Age-specific and parity-specific data allow identification of changes to fertility 
in a manner that can determine the implications for completed fertility (Lattimore & Pobke, 
2008).  
 
While age-specific and parity-specific data can help to differentiate between tempo effects 
and quantum effects when assessing policy outcomes, changes in tempo are non-neutral with 
respect to long-term population structure. A policy is not necessarily ineffective in achieving 
long-term population effects if it only induces tempo effects. More births today equate to 
more potential mothers in the future, and the younger the mothers, the shorter the 
generational cycle. Lutz and Skirbekk (2005) advocate policies to bring forward births 
because this generates increased fertility momentum. Indeed, Lattimore and Pobke (2008) 
assert that quantum and tempo effects are intrinsically linked, bringing births forward reduces 
the possibility of events curtailing births in later years and the factors that affect timing of 
births (tempo) are also likely to induce additional births (quantum).  
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 Parity is the number of children born to a woman at that point of time. 
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2.5 Economic Determinants of Fertility 
 
Although there have been studies in which positive fertility effects of the Baby Bonus have 
been identified (Lain et al., 2009; Drago et al., 2011; Langridge et al., 2010), a lack of 
statistical controls for other determinants of fertility make the results less reliable. Indeed, 
Gauthier stresses the importance of using multivariate statistical techniques to isolate the 
effect of policies from other possible fertility determinants (Gauthier 2008). In their analysis 
of family benefits on fertility, Parr and Guest (2011) include macroeconomic variables in 
addition to work and income-related variables. They find evidence that economic variables 
have an effect at the individual level but connections between the broader macro economy 
and fertility are weak. 
 
Theoretically, in the Beckerian framework, the influence of the economic environment on 
fertility is ambiguous and depends on the relative strength of income and substitution effects 
(Becker 1991). Given the changing structure of the labour force over the past half century, 
the direct-cost and opportunity-cost structure for women leaving the workforce to have 
children has been changing. Greater gender equity with respect to child caring and rearing 
and fewer differentials in wages for men and women means the cost of childrearing is spread 
more evenly between both mother and father.  
 
A second economic theory linking fertility to income is Easterlin’s relative income 
hypothesis (Easterlin, 1975; Macunovich, 1998). Easterlin (1975) posits that the link between 
income and fertility depends on the cohort size of young adults, relative to those older.28 The 
rationale is that relative incomes are a function of cohort size, and large cohorts are 
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 The age distribution differs across studies. Jeon and Shields (2005) use ages 18–24 relative to 25–64, whereas 
Wright (1989) uses ages 15–29 relative to 30–64.  
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disadvantaged in education, employment and income earned. In addition, Easterlin suggests 
lagged parental income represents a proxy for consumer aspirations, with cohorts forming 
aspirations in their mid-teens aiming to at least maintain the living standards of their parents. 
A low level of relative income driven by high aspirations or low incomes causes 
compensating behaviour to raise standards of living and these can be reflected in low fertility 
and higher female participation (Macunovich, 2000; 2001; McNown & Rajbhandary, 2003; 
Pampel & Peters, 1995). 
 
Throughout the 1980s, international empirical studies found mixed, neutral or negative 
effects of economic conditions on fertility. More recently, the financial upheavals caused by 
the global financial crisis and resulting fluctuations have been shown to be associated with 
lower birth rates (Goldstein, Karaman Örsal, Kreyenfeld & Jasilioniene, 2013). 
 
Martin (2004) find that in Australia between 1976 and 2000, steep fertility declines appeared 
to coincide with periods of slower economic growth or higher unemployment, whereas this 
decline slowed over periods of higher economic growth.  
 
2.6 Discussion 
 
Theoretically, it is expected that a universal cash payment such as the Baby Bonus would 
increase fertility by reducing direct costs ceteris paribus. This effect can be strengthened via 
a number of social interaction mechanisms such as peer effects and changing social norms. 
Internationally, cash transfers have been shown to have small positive effects on fertility but 
cross-country comparison is difficult due to the diverse nature of the various policies. There 
have been a number of empirical studies assessing the fertility effects of the Australian Baby 
Bonus and in general the effects are positive, although the magnitude varies across studies. 
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Many of the studies are limited in that they cannot correctly account for other possible 
determinants of fertility such as changing tempo effects driven by postponement and the 
corresponding tempo distortions to period fertility measures. In addition, the literature 
predicts that any study of policy effects would need to control for changing economic and 
labour-force conditions.  
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Chapter 3: Methodology Overview 
 
 
3.1 Research Questions 
 
The Baby Bonus policy presents a natural experiment to explore the influence of cash 
incentives on fertility choice. Policies that change incentives to childbearing can induce a 
number of effects on fertility. First, a birth subsidy may increase quantum or the level of 
fertility, and second, it may influence the timing of births, inducing tempo effects such as 
recuperation or anticipation. Presented in this chapter is an overview of the methodology 
applied to identify policy effects on fertility in the relevant birth data.  
 
Prior to the policy introduction in 2004, demographers had no reason to believe the fertility 
rate would increase or move closer to replacement. Indeed, many developed countries have 
exhibited similar fertility patterns, with the fertility rates of younger and older women 
moving in opposite directions (d’Addio & d’Ecole, 2005). Yet, Australia has observed an 
increase in TFR since the policy’s introduction. Of course, assessing the effectiveness of 
policy is complicated by changes in underlying demographic, social and economic trends.  
 
The primary aim of the empirical analysis in this thesis is to explore the observed increase in 
fertility following the policy introduction, and through a sequential process of elimination of 
possible confounding factors (i.e. demographic, social, and economic), to evaluate the policy 
contribution to observed fertility growth.  
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Thus, to answer this question: 
 ‘Do cash incentives affect fertility choice and, if so, is there evidence to suggest that 
incentives induce a permanent fertility increase over the period of study, rather than simply a 
change in the timing of births?’  
 
The following factors need to be considered: 
 
1a Could the observed increases be due to past momentum of previous fertility behavioural 
change (i.e. postponement and subsequent recuperation)? 
 Is there evidence of a differential response to the policy across maternal age? 
 Is there evidence of a differential response across birth order?  
 
1b Could the observed fertility increases be driven by macroeconomic or labour-market 
trends? 
 Do different maternal age groups exhibit differing sensitivities of fertility choice to 
economic circumstances? 
 
The methodology applied to answer these questions is presented in the following section. The 
model specifications are presented in the relevant chapters; however, some generalised 
characteristics of the methodology applied are presented here.  
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3.2 Methodology 
 
Time series analysis is applied in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 to address questions 1a 
and 1b, to determine the post-policy fertility changes, while controlling for demographic and 
macroeconomic factors. Hedonic regression techniques are applied in Chapter 7 to address 
question 1c and explore the housing costs faced by growing families.  
 
The fertility response to the policy is evaluated using state space time series analysis on both 
national monthly birth rates (data sourced from the ABS) and a number of age-specific and 
parity-specific monthly births rates generated from VPDC data. Changes in birth ratios are 
considered permanent over the period of analysis if a change in the trend function is 
observed. Following the classic paper by Perron (1989), the presence of both a change in the 
level of the series and a change in the slope of the trend function are permitted. A change in 
the level reflects a change in underlying average birth ratios per period, whereas a change in 
the slope reflects a change in growth in birth ratios. If the trend is determined by fundamental 
demographic and economic determinants of fertility, and if these fundamental determinants 
either have not changed or are controlled for over the period of analysis, by considering age 
and order-specific birth ratios, as well as changes in economic variables, the changes in the 
trend function following the introduction of the policy may be viewed as policy induced. 
 
Recognising the importance of allowing for both level and slope breaks, a state space 
modelling formulation commonly referred to as Seeming Unrelated Time Series Equations 
SUTSE is employed. 
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Structural time series models are models that are formulated directly in terms of trends, 
seasonals and irregularities. The SUTSE model is a class of multivariate models wherein the 
unobserved components in each individual time series are allowed to be correlated with each 
other (Fernandez and Harvey 1990). The SUTSE is deemed appropriate for analysis of the 
birth data time series as it is assumed that the related series would be affected by similar 
environment and so move together through none necessarily causes the other.  
Estimates are obtained in a ‘model-based’ framework. Whether a state or component is 
treated stochastically or deterministically can be determined by evaluating the disturbance 
associated with the state component. The SUTSE model applied is a local level trend model 
equivalent to ARIMA (0,2,2). In ARIMA model trends and seasonality are eliminated 
wherein structural models these may be of interest in their own right. Analyses of structural 
models are more transparent as predicted behaviour of each component can be checked 
against that expected in the data. State space models are flexible in that known breaks can be 
incorporated directly into the system over time whereas Box and Jenkins ARIMA models, 
assume that differenced series are stationary and therefore more rigid. Explanatory variables 
and structural breaks are more easily handled in the state space framework. A structural break 
such a permanent increase or decreases of the level component from a point in time can be 
captured through a step intervention variable or an impulse in the level equation. A 
permanent change in the slope is captured by adding an impulse intervention into the slope 
equation. 
The Kalman filter is the main procedure used to estimate dynamic systems represented in 
state space form. It operates by means of prediction and correction mechanism. Jalles (2009 
pg 18) provides a good summary of the estimation procedure: 
• the model is formulated in state-space form and for a set of initial parameters,  
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• the model prediction errors are generated from the filter.  
these are then used to recursively evaluate the likelihood function until it is maximized. This 
SUTSE method has been shown to be very useful in measuring the effectiveness of 
government intervention in the area of social policy (Koopman et al, 2009: Durbin & 
Harvey1986) and modelling macroeconomic variables under different policy regimes 
(Angeriz & Arestis, 2008). State space methods provide a framework for the decomposition 
of time series into trend and seasonal components in order to identify the dynamics of the 
time series simultaneously. Further, these components can vary overtime and thus provide a 
flexible framework for modelling variables with stochastic properties.  This flexibility 
distinguishes this approach from traditional regression approaches which constrain the 
components to be deterministic. Another benefit of using this approach is that stationarity of 
the time series is not required and multivariate extensions are handled easily (Commandeur 
and Koopman, 2007). This is important as variables reflecting fertility and labour market 
trends may be non-stationary time series (McNown and Rajbhandary, 2003). 
 
Unobserved component models or structural time series models are fitted using Structural 
Time Series Analyser, Modeller and Predictor (STAMP) 8.2. STAMP enables detection of 
some unusual movements in a time series. 29 The fertility change intervention dates were 
initially identified through a flexible modelling approach. Subsequently, a combination of 
level breaks and slope breaks were used to minimise residuals.  
 
First, in Chapter 4, a model in which national birth ratios is the dependent variable is applied 
to gauge the fertility implications of the policy at a national level. While this analysis goes 
                                                            
29
 For a detailed discussion of the theory of structural time series models, refer to Harvey (1991); Harvey & 
Proietti (2005) and Harvey & Shephard (1993). 
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someway to determining the effect of the policy, the national-level data does not allow for the 
comprehensive analysis across maternal age and birth order that is necessary to address the 
questions raised in 1a and 1b. To better control for underlying economic and demographic 
trends, a Victorian case study using VPDC are applied in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. 
 
 The second and third stages, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 respectively, involve a more 
disaggregated approach in which ASBRs and age-specific and order-specific birth ratios are 
the dependent variables examined. The intervention variables applied in Chapter 5 and 
Chapter 6 are informed by the national analysis in Chapter 4. With each model developed, a 
subsequent extended model inclusive of explanatory variables is estimated and discussed to 
establish the robustness of results presented, and by doing so addresses question 1b.  
 
While there are some limitations on time series analysis to isolate causal relationships, 
primarily due to the inability to control a broad range of complex influences on fertility 
choice such as education or cultural background, a consideration of trends in aggregate 
fertility assists in identifying key policy-related fertility patterns at a societal level.  
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Indeed, McNown and Rajbhandary (2003 p. 502) state: 
‘some variables when measured at the level of society of the individual, reflect each 
person’s relative position within society and such effects may be absent at the aggregate 
level. Conversely, social contagion may induce aggregate responses to changes that are 
not reflected in individual differences’. 
 
In addition to examining the data for changes in the trend that may reflect long-term 
behavioural changes in fertility choice, a set of discretionary birth-timing effects (largely 
related to discretionary Caesarean sections) that have been established in previous research 
are controlled for (Gans & Leigh, 2009). Outlier dummy variables capture temporary sudden 
increases in the value of the level. These discretionary birth-timing effects are captured by 
fitting outlier variables to the month’s pre and post the policy introduction (i.e. June and July 
2004) and in June and July 2006, when there was a substantial increment to the subsidy. 
Although they are not fertility effects, these discretionary birth-timing effects need to be 
modelled to capture the dynamics of the time series in question.  
 
3.3 Explanatory Variables 
 
A set of explanatory variables is included to address question 1b and control for the effects of 
economic factors and trends in fertility. The addition of explanatory variables to a structural 
time series model is a mixture of time series and regression, with coefficients of explanatory 
variables interpreted in the same manner as regression coefficients. A brief theoretical 
rationale for the inclusion of given explanatory variables is listed below. 
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3.3.1 The Unemployment Rate: Male and Female 
 
The relative changes in male and female wages can affect fertility differentially.30 Becker 
(1991) predicts an ambiguous effect of female employment on fertility. Higher female wages 
has an income effect but also a negative substitution effect as rising female wages means a 
higher opportunity cost of having children due to foregone earnings. Recent empirical studies 
have found that higher unemployment induces females to postpone and space births, which 
results in lower fertility (Narayan, 2006).31 In addition, aggregate unemployment may affect 
fertility behaviour indirectly by altering risk perceptions and/or depressing average wage 
levels (Ozcan, Mayer & Luedicke, 2010). 
 
3.3.2 The Female Participation Rate 
 
Typically, cross-country comparisons of female participation rates and fertility are negative. 
However, more recent studies identify a positive relationship. The negative effect is 
predominantly driven by the fact that small children require a mother’s time, but if one 
considers Hakim’s (2003) preference theory, some women may have a preference for career 
over children. Easterlin’s hypothesis posits that larger cohorts face lower relative incomes 
and thus compensate by labour-market behaviour such as higher female participation leading 
to lower fertility (Engelhardt, Kögel & Prskawetz, 2004; Macunovich, 2000). However, 
Narayan (2006) finds a positive effect of female participation and female education on 
fertility in Taiwan.  
                                                            
30
 In their comprehensive review of the literature on the connections between economic recessions and fertility, 
Sobotka et al. (2011, p. 272) state that indicators other than GDP may more readily identify the pathways 
through which recession affects fertility. Adsera and Menendez (2011) find a total decline of fertility in times of 
economic contractions and this is associated with rising unemployment, rather than lower GDP. 
31
 Adsera (2004) finds a strong negative effect of unemployment on fertility, especially younger women (births 
postponed due to unemployment). The literature in general shows a mixed or counter-cyclical relationship on 
fertility up to the late 1980s, and a suggestion of a pro-cyclical relationships since then (Ahn & Mira, 2002; 
Engelhardt et al., 2004; Kogel, 2001). 
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3.3.3 Household Expectations as Captured by the CSI  
 
The global financial crisis has sparked renewed interest in the literature on the role of 
economic uncertainty for fertility decision making (Kreyenfeld, Andersson & Pailhé, 2012). 
Economic uncertainties may have different fertility effects at different stages of the life 
course. Hofmann and Hohmeyer (2013) find strong economic concerns in Germany are 
significantly related to lower fertility in women aged between 26 and 44. Bhaumick and 
Nugent (2005) find that the uncertainty associated with East German transition 1992–2002 
contributed to the sharp fall in fertility observed at this time (Bhaumik & Nugent, 2005). 
Fokkema, de Valk, de Beer and Van Duin (2008) analyse an array of factors that affect 
childbearing decision making of which economic uncertainly is one. The Consumer 
Sentiment Index (CSI) is used to capture and control for household sentiment around current 
and expected economic conditions. 
 
3.4 Data 
 
National monthly birth rates are analysed in Chapter 4 to gauge the effect of the policy at a 
national level. This data set was ordered from the ABS and monthly birth ratios were 
estimated using estimated female population aged 15 to 49 (ABS 2011). In Chapters 5 and 
Chapter 6, the data used are Victorian perinatal data (VPDC) from January 1983 to December 
2008 (N = 1,671,774). The VPDC unit is a state-wide population surveillance system to 
collect and analyse data on the health of mothers and their babies. The data are collected via a 
birth report containing over 100 items relating to maternal and child health and demographics 
relevant to the perinatal period (i.e. 20 weeks gestation to 28 days post birth). Access to the 
VPDC data was subject to RMIT ethics clearance and approval by the Consultative Council 
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on Obstetric and Paediatric Mortality and Morbidity (CCOPMM). ASBR and ASBR by birth-
order  time series were developed using these data. 32 
 
In both the national-level and Victorian-level analysis, key fertility-relevant macroeconomic 
indicators (female, male unemployment, female participation, male unemployment,33 national 
gross domestic product (GDP) growth and state final demand)34 used as control variables are 
sourced from the ABS, as are female population estimates35 used to calculate birth ratios. 
Household perceptions of economic uncertainty are captured using the Westpac-Melbourne 
Institute Survey of Consumer Sentiment.36  
 
  
                                                            
32
 The ASBR equals the number of births to women in age group i  divided by the estimated number of women 
in age group i multiplied by 1000. 
33
 ABS Cat. No. 6202, Labour force Australia (Tables 2 and 5.19). 
34
 ABS Cat. No. 5206.0, Australian national accounts: National income, expenditure and product. 
35
 ABS Cat. No. 3101, Australian Demographic Statistics (Tables 52 and 59). 
36
 Please refer to http://www.melbourneinstitute.com/miaesr/publications/indicators/csi.html. 
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Chapter 4: An Appraisal of the Fertility Effect of the  
Australian Baby Bonus 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The Australian Baby Bonus was announced in May 2004 as a subsidy of $3,000 for each 
child born after 30 June 2004. This amount was increased in July 2006 and July 2008 to 
$4,000 and $5,000 respectively.37 While the Baby Bonus has received academic attention,38 
and ample media commentary on it implications and outcomes, there are no comprehensive 
studies to date that have considered whether the Baby Bonus has had a sustained effect on the 
national fertility rate, nor any that have attempted to gauge the effects of macroeconomic 
influences on the fertility rate in Australia over the same period.  
 
The focus of this chapter is to assess the impact of the Baby Bonus on aggregate birth ratios. 
By using a structural time series model (Harvey, 1991), the effect of the Baby Bonus policy 
on fertility in Australia until September 2009 is examined. In particular, the number of births 
per 1,000 women of childbearing age is modelled to determine whether the Baby Bonus has 
had a temporary or sustained effect on fertility levels. Economic variables are included in the 
model to control for the possibility that fertility changes are influenced by fluctuations in 
macroeconomic conditions.  
 
                                                            
37
 A significant change also occurred on 1 January 2009 when the Baby bonus became means tested and payable 
in 13 equal instalments if the total family income equalled $75,000 or less in the first six months following the 
birth of the child. However, it is difficult to determine what fertility effects this might have had given that not 
enough data following this policy change are currently available. 
38
 Please see Anderson (2007); Balter (2006); Drago et al. (2011); Dunn (2005); Einarsdóttir et al. (2012); Gans 
and Leigh (2007); 2009; Heard (2010); Jackson (2006); Jackson and Casey (2009); Lain et al. (2009); Langridge 
et al. (2010); McDonald (2005); Parr and Guest (2011); and Risse (2010). 
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A policy-induced tempo fertility effect may be immediate if couples are sufficiently 
motivated to have children as a result of the publicity surrounding the announcement of the 
policy, reducing immediate liquidity constraints or concerns that the policy is time limited39. 
If fertility effects are purely timing related, the number of births would temporarily increase 
approximately nine to 10 months following the announcement before returning to their long-
run path after a short period.  
 
Birth-timing effects may also be more delayed and cumulative in nature. This could be due to 
anticipation, which is the case when the timing of births is brought forward as a result of the 
policy and could also be extended to include recuperation of previously postponed children. 
If such a tempo effect occurred, the fertility rate would temporarily increase or grow and then 
decrease relative to the long-run path. This can be differentiated from the previous tempo 
effect only in the immediacy of the fertility response to the policy. However, the net effect of 
tempo effects is more births in a shorter period, rather than more births in total.  
 
However, policies that induce tempo effects are not completely neutral with respect to long-
term population growth due to a compressing of the generational cycle. Indeed, Lutz and 
Skirbekk (2005) advocate the implementation of policies to affect the timing of births over a 
woman’s life cycle. The rationale being that the higher fertility rates in the short term, the 
stronger the force of positive momentum in the longer run.  
 
There is no reason to assume a priori that the Baby Bonus will have only a temporary effect 
on fertility, as the initial fertility response may be maintained or even magnified over time. 
Endogenous social norm effects may act to influence the fertility choices of women who were 
                                                            
39
 From a statistical perspective it takes on average four months to conceive and the probability of conception 
decreases with maternal age 
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not initially directly affected by the subsidy itself. An individual’s fertility decision making 
may change not only because of a change in government payments but also because of the 
behaviour of their peers. Furthermore, a slower moving growth in fertility may emerge, due 
to resource constraints and policy information lags. Individuals and couples may also need to 
put in place social and medical supports before they have children.40 This may be particularly 
relevant for couples engaging in assisted reproductive technology (for example in vitro 
fertilisation), which have become increasingly utilised in recent years (Wang, Chambers & 
Sullivan 2010).41 Therefore, although decisions to have a child may be made in a timely 
fashion, the actual fertility response may take longer to occur. Discussion of the effect of 
social interactions on fertility extends the notion that initial positive changes in fertility can 
have longer term effects on population growth. However, the purpose of this chapter is to 
quantify the effectiveness of the policy in changing fertility rates, and while these behavioural 
models provide useful insight into why policy might be effective incorporating behavioural 
aspects is beyond the scope of this analysis. 
 
Gans and Leigh (2009) find that the government policy induced in parents strategic birth-
timing behaviour to be eligible to receive the Baby Bonus payment. As the policy was 
announced seven weeks prior to its introduction, this gave parents an opportunity, where 
possible, to schedule a birthdate within the eligible period. They estimate that up to 1,000 
births were ‘moved’ with births dipping in the days prior to the policy introduction and 
increasing after it.42 Changes to the timing of births were also noted in 2006 due to an 
                                                            
40
 A study by the Australian Institute for Family Studies (Gray et al., 2008) suggests that individuals, on 
average, want to have more children than the replacement fertility level of 2.1. However, due to financial 
constraints, as well as work-related issues and partnership issues, have no plans to do so. 
41Increasing from 6,792 live births in 2004 to 10,633 live births in 2008 (see Table 3.5). (Wang et al 2010) 
42
 They found that children born within the eligibility period (post 1 July 2004) were more likely to be of higher 
birth weight. This can have health implications and thus, generate unintended policy consequences (Gans & 
Leigh, 2009). 
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incremental increase in the subsidy (Gans & Leigh, 2007).43 It is important to differentiate the 
birth-timing effect from the tempo fertility effects discussed above. Hereafter, the 
discretionary moving of the birth date to be eligible for the payment will be referred to as a 
discretionary birth-timing effect. 
 
4.2 Methodology 
 
This section outlines the structural time series model used to quantify the effect of the Baby 
Bonus. The model is applied to three different birth measures: monthly birth numbers, 
monthly fertility rates, and quarterly fertility rates; thus, enabling key economic variables to 
be considered. The birth and population data span January 1990 to October 2009 and is 
sourced from the ABS. The fertility rate is defined as the number of babies born per 1,000 
women of child bearing age where child bearing age is defined as females aged between 15 
and 49 (ABS 2011a).44 The fertility rate is calculated on the basis of an annual estimated 
residential population of females aged 15 to 49. 
 
From July 2007, it was a requirement to register the birth of a child to be eligible for receipt 
of the Baby Bonus. It should be noted that late registrations of births are recorded in the 
registration year, as opposed to the birth year, and therefore, the ABS data series may deviate 
from hospital records in the years prior to obligatory registration (McDonald, 2005). 
  
                                                            
43
 Short-term birth-timing effects have also being identified by Tamm (2009) with respect to changing German 
parental leave; and by Kuhn and Brunner (2011) in relation to a cessation of Austria’s baby bonus. 
44
 Estimated annual residential population of females aged 15 to 49 is sourced from ABS (2011a)  table 5.9 
estimates resident population by single year of age. Values for each female aged 15 to 49 are summed to 
generate an estimated figure for fertile women; values are calculated from series i.d. A2159036L to A2159070T. 
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4.3 The Model 
 
The structural time series model is fitted to the data using STAMP (Koopman et al., 2006). 
Specifically, the model used (assuming yt denotes the fertility rate at time t) has the following 
general form:  
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where , , tX  and tZ  denote the trend, seasonal, explanatory and fertility change related 
intervention variables at time t. Equation (1) is often referred to as the observation equation, 
whereas equations (2a) to (2c) are a set of measurement or state equations. The trend 
(equations [2a] and [2b]) is comprised of two components: 1−tµ  and 1−tβ , where tβ  captures 
the growth in the series and 1−tµ
 
the level. The coefficients Θ and Φ measure the direction 
and size of the explanatory and post-policy fertility-intervention variables respectively. 
Importantly, by including a set of post-policy fertility-intervention variables it is possible to 
measure the departure from the underlying trend 45  in fertility rates coinciding with the 
introduction and subsequent modifications in the Baby Bonus policy. 
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 Note the underlying trend is a general term referring to the entire data-generating process as depicted by all 
equations of the structural time series model excluding the term ΦZt.  
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Three types of policy and fertility-related intervention variables are considered in the 
subsequent section. The first corresponding to that presented in equation (1), which 
represents a positive or negative spike (outlier) in the data. This type of intervention 
corresponds to the discretionary birth-timing effect (Gans & Leigh, 2009).  
 
That is, by specifying outlier dummies in the measurement equation of the form: 
,7,200426,20041 tttt ddy εφφγµ ++++=
                                   (3), 
the birth-timing effect can be measured. Specifically if the Baby Bonus had a significant 
birth-timing effect, then the coefficient φ1 should be negative and significantly different from 
zero, and φ2 should be positive and significantly different from zero (assuming the variable 
was behaving consistently with its historical time path). The second and third types of 
interventions correspond to equations (2a) and (2b), representing a change in the underlying 
level (mean) and slope (growth trajectory) in the data. These changes are characteristically 
different from the discretionary birth-timing effect, indicating structural changes in the 
fertility behaviour exhibited by the population as a whole has occurred. 
 
4.4 Application and Results 
 
To contextualise the findings, the fertility rates over the past two decades are briefly 
discussed. Figure 4.1 presents the fertility rate46 from January 1990 to October 2009. Two 
distinguishing features are evident: one is the decline in the general rate for the first 15 years 
and the second is the noticeable increase following the introduction of the Baby Bonus. The 
shaded area in Figure 4.1 corresponds to March 2005 to October 2009, identifying the period 
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 Defined here as the number of births divided by the annual estimated female population aged 15–49* 1000. 
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in which the policy could have had an effect given the nature of the reproductive cycle. The 
date at which the policy was introduced is also identified. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Australian Fertility Rate 
Note: The Australian monthly fertility rates are calculated using data from the ABS data (Cat. No. 3301 
and 3201.0). The fertility rate is defined as the number of births divided by the annual estimated resident 
population of females aged 15–49. 
 
Importantly, the pronounced change in March 2005, approximately 10 months following the 
announcement of the Baby Bonus, suggests that the policy has had an impact on fertility 
rates. By using the structural model outlined in the previous section, it is possible to quantify 
this structural change and hence the change in the underlying fertility behaviour of the 
population as a whole. 
 
Initially, two models of the dependent variables are considered: birth numbers and fertility 
rate. The first model considers whether short-term birth-timing effects (outliers) of the type 
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identified by Gans and Leigh (2009) are evident at the introduction of the policy in July 2004 
and for subsequent changes in the magnitude and structure of the policy.  
Thus, the model presented in equation 3 is extended to test multiple outliers, the results of which 
are presented in table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1: (Model 1) Coefficient Estimates and Selected Diagnostics:  
Discretionary Birth-timing Effects 
 
Date Coefficient P-value 
June 2004 –1,248 0.001 
July 2004 783 0.040 
June 2006 –333 0.380 
July 2006 258 0.496 
June 2008 –497 0.496 
July 2008 795 0.037 
December 2008 1,634 <0.001 
January 2009 –277 0.400 
November 1990 1,733 <0.001 
December 1990 –716 0.060 
R2s = 0.54 Normality = 0.75*  DW = 2.07* 
 
Note: The dependent variable relating to the estimates provided is the number of babies born. The 
frequency of the data is monthly. Each coefficient represents a deviation from the underlying trend in the 
form of an outlier. The dates chosen reflect the introduction of and subsequent policy changes to the Baby 
Bonus scheme. The coefficients relating to the year 1990 are the only exceptions corresponding to data 
irregularities detected when fitting the model. The critical value for the normality test (where null 
corresponds to normality) is 5.99 (Koopman et al., 2009, p. 201); thus, indicating the residuals are normally 
distributed. The p-value for Durbin–Watson (DW) is 0.70, which indicates autocorrelation is not present 
(Harvey, 1990). The coefficient of determination presented is seasonal adjusted.48 
 
The results in Table 4.1 concur with the finding of Gans and Leigh (2009). However, they do 
not support their subsequent findings regarding a birth-timing effect in 2007 as the result of 
the increased value of the Baby Bonus (Gans & Leigh, 2007). Similarly, the results do not 
suggest a discretionary birth-timing effect corresponding to the 2008 increase (assuming α = 
0.05). 
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 See Harvey, Koopman and Penzer (1998) for a discussion relating to the suitability of structural models  to the 
analysis of data irregularities such as outliers and structural breaks 
48
 Please see Koopman et al. (2009, p. 206) for a detailed explanation of the appropriate coefficient of 
determination.  
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 However, they do indicate that in December 2008, an abnormally high number of babies 
were born, suggesting the decision to means test the Baby Bonus from January 1, 2009 had a 
significant impact on the discretionary timing of births.  
 
However, the results in Table 4.1, simply identify whether there was a change in birth-timing 
effect around the time of the policy introduction but shed little light on whether there have 
been any observable changes in fertility patterns after the policy introduction.  
To determine whether there has been a structural change in fertility behaviour, changing 
patterns in births per 1,000 women of childbearing age are investigated. Model 2 permits the 
presence of both a change in the level of the series and a change in the slope of the trend 
function. Changes in birth ratios are considered permanent over the period of analysis if a 
change in the trend function is observed. 
 
Model 2 is further refined by elimination of insignificant variables in Model 1. Table 4.2 
presents the results of Model 2. The results suggest that the fertility rate changed significantly 
approximately 10 months after the announcement of the Baby Bonus.  
 
The results in Table 4.2 indicate that at least 0.221 additional babies have been born per 
1,000 women of child bearing age per month since March 2005 (approximately 1,100 babies 
using annual population estimates) and that this was reinforced by a delayed fertility effect 
with a cumulative increase of .015 babies per 1,000 women per month (approximately 70 
babies) every month between January 2006 and December 2007. 
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Table 4.2: (Model 2) Coefficient Estimates and Selected Diagnostics 
Break type Date Coefficient P-value 
Level break March 2005 0.221 <0.001 
Slope break January 2006 0.015 <0.001 
Slope break January 2008 –0.019 <0.001 
Outlier  June 2004 –0.265 <0.001 
Outlier December 2008 0.346 <0.001 
Outlier November 1990 0.407 <0.001 
 R^s2 = 0.56 Normality = 0.26*  DW = 
1.85* 
*The critical value for the normality test (where null corresponds to normality) is 5.99 (Koopman et al., 
2009, p. 201); thus, indicating the residuals are normally distributed. The p-value for Durbin–Watson is 
0.41, which indicates autocorrelation is not present (Harvey, 1990).49 
 
 
Interestingly, the coefficient estimates of the slope break approximately add to zero, 
suggesting that the cumulative increases have been maintained, that is, an approximate 
additional 1,700 babies have been born each month since January 2008.50 Further, these 
results suggest that until June 2009, approximately 108,000 births can be attributed to the 
Baby Bonus policy incentives. The calculated direct cost of each additional birth is 
approximately $43,000 (ABS 2010a).51  
 
In Figure 4.2, the trend estimate for the period January 2003 to October 2009 is presented. An 
increase in the trend in January 2006 is consistent with a delayed fertility response to the 
introduction of the policy. It should be noted that this increase in the trend takes place before 
the July 2006 increase in the Baby Bonus, and therefore, potentially reflects a delayed 
                                                            
49
 The dependent variable relating to the estimates provided is the number of babies born per 1,000 women of 
childbearing age. The frequency of the data is monthly. Each coefficient represents a deviation from the 
underlying trend. Three forms of deviation are determined: a shift in the mean (level break), a change in the 
growth (slope break) and a series of outliers. An outlier is identified in November 1990. 
50
 Calculated as 0.221 + 0.36 babies per 1,000 women of childbearing age per month. The value 0.36 is 
calculated by assuming that the second slope change perfectly offsets the first. Given the standard errors for the 
January 2006 and January 2008 coefficients are 0.003 and 0.005 respectively, this is a valid assumption. The 
0.36 is therefore the cumulative departure from the underlying historical fertility rate for the month of December 
2007, specifically 0.015 x 24. 
51
 Please refer to the ABS (2010a). Year book Australia 2009–10, Table 9.22, for a total estimated cost of the 
baby bonus 2004–2009.  
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response to the initial introduction of the Baby Bonus, rather than the effect of additional 
financial incentives. While subsequent growth in birth numbers appears to have peaked by 
January 2008, the true magnitude of this delayed effect will become clearer over time as more 
data become available. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Fertility Trend Estimate: Model 1 
Note: The fertility rates and estimated trend include the intervention estimates from January 2003 to 
September 2009. The fertility rate is defined as the number of births divided by the number of women of 
childbearing age (15–49 years). 
 
4.5 Controlling for Economic Influence and Expectations 
 
In this section, intervention effects are re-estimated, while controlling for economic factors 
that could plausibly be associated with changes in fertility. For example, changes in women’s 
wages may influence the opportunity cost of bearing and rearing children, while higher levels 
of household income may reduce financial constraints and therefore increase the demand for 
children.  
 
Current employment can often be a proxy for expectations of future employment and future 
income streams (Bono, 2001; Huttunen & Kellokumpu, 2012). To capture a household’s 
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current aggregate economic circumstances, unemployment statistics and the Westpac CSI are 
modelled against monthly birth ratios. It was found that the fertility-intervention results for 
Model 2 held, and the explanatory variables were found not to exert a significant effect on 
birth ratios.52 
 
As most income-related economic indicators are recorded on a quarterly frequency, further 
analysis requires the monthly birth ratios to be converted into quarterly rates. Average weekly 
earnings (AWE) for females and real GDP per capita (RGDPpc) lagged four quarters are 
modelled in this section to further control for macroeconomic factors.  
 
The quarterly conversion undertaken involves two steps. The first step is to aggregate the 
number of births over the relevant three months for each quarter. This figure is then divided 
by the estimated number of women of childbearing age, as at the end of the quarter.53 
Effectively, this calculation results in a trebling of the average monthly rate for each quarter. 
 
Appendix 4a presents the coefficient estimates of the intervention and economic variables. 
For the period January 1990 to October 2009, none of the economic determinants of fertility 
tested are statistically significant. This may be a reflection of the relatively stable growth 
experienced over the observed period.  
  
                                                            
52
 A full set of results for Model 2a, which models the monthly Australian CSI over the period are available in 
Appendix 4B. 
53
 Estimated population by age is available annually. 
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4.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Presented in this chapter is an analysis of the effect of the Australia Baby Bonus on 
Australian births between March 2005 and September 2009 using an unobserved components 
model. The results indicate a significant increase in birth numbers 10 months following the 
announcement of the Baby Bonus, and that this increase in fertility was maintained, as were 
the cumulative delayed increases in births. The results are also consistent with the 
discretionary birth-timing effect identified by Gans and Leigh (2009) due to the introduction 
of the Baby Bonus in July 2004. However, the results do not support the existence of such an 
effect following the 2006 increase in the value of the Baby Bonus (Gans & Leigh, 2009). It 
may be that the increment in the bonus was not deemed sufficient to motivate a delay in 
discretionary timing of births. In addition, RGDPpc and average weekly female earnings 
were not found to exert significant influence on fertility. This may be due to the relatively 
stable growth achieved in Australia over this period or the complex interaction of income and 
substitution effects on fertility choice.  
 
Given the sustained increase in birth rates over a four-year period, the existence of a purely 
temporary fertility effect is not supported by the data. However, age-specific and parity-
specific data are needed to exclude the possibility of a recuperation effect wherein higher 
fertility rates at these significant dates were driven by women who were previously delaying 
having children; thus, having no positive net effect on their completed fertility.  
 
While this chapter has focused on the aggregate fertility implications of the Baby Bonus, 
research such as that of Lain et al. (2009) and Langridge et al. (2010) suggests that there may 
be a different response to the policy across the population. Lain et al. (2009) find that the 
52 
 
greatest increase in the NSW birth rate relative to the trend was observed in teenagers, while 
Langridge et al. (2010) find that in Western Australia the greatest increase in births were 
among those women living in high socioeconomic areas. The aggregation of both birth data 
and population means that subtleties in family decision making cannot be modelled.54  
The focus of the subsequent chapters is to assess the variability in the response, and delay in 
response, to the Baby Bonus across maternal characteristics such as age and prior births.  
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 ABS data do not distinguish between planned and unplanned pregnancies or trace abortions and births in 
relation to unplanned pregnancies. 
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Appendix 4 
Appendix 4A 
Table 4A.1: Model 2a: Quarterly Conversion 
 
Type Date Coefficient P-value 
    
Level break 2005 Q1 0.592 <0.001 
Slope break 2006 Q1 0.133 <0.001 
Slope break 2008 Q1 –0.108 0.042 
Outlier 2004 Q2 –0.333 0.048 
Outlier 2008 Q4 0.168 0.312 
AWEt-4(female)  –0.001 0.760 
RGDPpct-4  –0.0003 0.149 
 R2 = 0.50 Normality = 0.68*  DW = 2.11* 
*The critical value for the normality test (where null corresponds to normality) is 5.99 (Koopman, 2009, 
p. 201); thus, indicating the residuals are normally distributed. The p-value for Durbin–Watson is 0.70, 
which indicates autocorrelation is not present (Harvey, 1990). 
 
The dependent variable relating to the estimates provided is the number of babies born per 
1,000 women of childbearing age. The frequency of the data is quarterly. Each break 
coefficient represents a deviation from the underlying trend. Three forms of deviation are 
determined: a shift in the mean (level break); a change in the growth trajectory (slope break) 
and a series of one-off spikes (outlier). The estimates presented correspond to the 
introduction and some subsequent policy changes in the Baby Bonus scheme. 
 
Importantly, although quarterly, rather than monthly, data were utilised, the intervention 
effects remain consistent with the findings of Model 2 presented in Table 4.2 (with the 
exception of the December 2008 outlier). Notably, the level break is approximately three 
times larger in Table 4A.1 than it is in Table 4.2. Further, it is noted that the slope 
coefficients are statistically insignificant from six. For months one, two and three, the 
deviation cumulates resulting in estimated deviations of 0.015 [1 x 0.015], 0.038[2 x 0.015] 
54 
 
and 0.052[3 x 0.015] respectively. Thus, for any given quarter the approximate slope 
deviation using monthly data is estimated to be 0.09 = [6 x 0.015], which is not statistically 
different from 0.133 given the standard error is estimated to be 0.037. Similarly, the 95% 
confidence interval for the January 2008 slope intervention is (–0.006,–0.200) which contains 
the estimated monthly quarterly estimate of –0.108 [6x = 0.018]. 
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Appendix 4B 
Table 4B.1: Model 2b: Economic Variables—Monthly Frequency 
Break type Date Coefficient P-value 
Level break March 2005 0.23 0.00 
Slope break January 2006 0.02 0.00 
Slope break January 2008 –0.03 0.00 
Outlier June 2004 –0.26 0.00 
Outlier December 2008 0.35 0.00 
Outlier  November 1990 0.42 0.00 
CSI 12  –0.00 0.44 
Aggregate hours worked  
Female % total t-12 
 –0.18 0.41 
Female participation rate t-12  –0.01 0.24 
Female unemployment rate t-12  0.018 0.15 
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Chapter 5: Heterogeneity of Response to the Baby Bonus across  
Maternal Age: A Victorian Case Study 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Australia, like most developed countries experiencing below-replacement fertility levels, has 
observed a significant ageing of women commencing childbearing and childrearing. 
Fundamental changes in society such as rising education and employment opportunities for 
women and greater access to effective contraception saw women in the mid-2000s more 
likely to have children in their early thirties, as opposed to their early twenties, as was the 
case in the 1960s (ABS, 2010a).55The Australian TFR56 also declined over this period and in 
2003, the TFR was 1.75, having been below-replacement level (2.1) for 28 years (ABS, 
2011a). This decline in the TFR has turned around after the introduction of the Baby Bonus 
policy, but of course, assessing the effectiveness of this policy is complicated by 
contemporary changes in underlying demographic, social and economic trends. 
 
The Australian Baby Bonus elicited a positive impact on achieved fertility at an aggregate 
level, while controlling for macroeconomic circumstances, economic expectations, labour-
market trends and population trends. A discretionary birth-timing effect of the policy on its 
introduction was quantified with results concurring with those of Gans and Leigh (2009). 
Useful as this may be, there are limitations to fertility studies with this level of aggregation.  
 
                                                            
55Refer to Mills et al. (2011) for a comprehensive discussion on the central reasons for postponement. Balbo et 
al. (2013) also provide a comprehensive review of research relating to ongoing fertility changes in developed 
countries, with a particular focus on postponement.  
56
 The TFR represents the number of children a woman could expect to bear during her lifetime if she 
experienced current age-specific fertility rates in each year of her reproductive life (ABS, 2012). 
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In the national-level analysis presented in Chapter 4, significant fertility changes were 
identified in March 2005, January 2006 and January 2008, the first date representing 10 
months post the policy introduction, the second a change in growth in births rates, and finally 
in January 2008 a stabilisation of the growth in births rates. However, the absence of age-
specific and parity-specific data at a national level, mean it is difficult to ascertain whether 
the policy induced birth timing or permanent fertility increases over the period of study. 
Access to VPDC data enables this question to be explored in more detail and to control, 
where possible, for explanations for fertility growth raised in the literature. 
 
The contribution of this chapter is to extend the analysis presented in Chapter 4. The 
significant breaks identified in the national data are applied to a richer data set that enables 
changing fertility patterns to be better investigated. The maternal-age-specific responses to 
the incentives of the Baby Bonus are explored using Victorian population data, sourced from 
the VPDC 57  and analysed using multivariate structural time series modelling SUTSE 
(Harvey, 1991). Victoria has an estimated population of 5.6 million in 2012, representing 
close to a quarter of Australia’s population (ABS, 2012a). Thus, changing patterns of fertility 
behaviour in Victoria are likely to be a good representation of fertility patterns at the national 
level.  
 
The empirical focus is to identify whether Victorian women of different age groups reacted 
differently or simultaneously to the policy and by doing so, separate policy-induced fertility 
outcomes from cohort-driven trends such as postponement and recuperation effects. This is 
important, as recuperation of previously postponed births is often cited as the driving force 
                                                            
57
 Please refer to http://www.health.vic.gov.au/ccopmm/vpdc/index.htm. 
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behind the observed increase in the TFR in the years following the policy introduction 
(Heard, 2010; Parr & Guest, 2011). 
 
The importance of identifying an age-specific policy response is emphasised by McDonald 
and Kippen (2007) who state that in terms of policy effectiveness, ‘A reversal of a trend 
should affect all groups simultaneously but should have a larger effect for more recent 
cohorts’ (p. 3). Where behaviour is not changing in response to policy, fertility changes may 
be limited to age-specific effects driven by the momentum of past changes in behaviour such 
as the recuperation of previously postponed births. There has yet to be a detailed study of the 
maternal-age-specific effect of the Baby Bonus on Victorian fertility choices. 
 
5.2 Demographic Trends, Birth Timing and Policy 
 
In the past two decades, many OECD countries have experienced changes in fertility patterns 
due to childbearing postponement and recuperation effects, which is demonstrated by the 
fertility rates of younger and older women moving in opposite directions (d’Addio & 
d’Ecole, 2005).58  Correlation in the decline of the TFR, with a delaying of motherhood 
suggests that fertility postponement may be a causal factor of longer term fertility decline 
(Billari & Kohler, 2004; Frejka, Sobotka, Hoem & Toulemon, 2008; Sobotka, 2004). 
Postponement is interrelated with quantum fertility because the age of first birth can affect 
total final births (Balbo, Billari & Mills, 2013). 59  The relationship between later 
commencement of childbearing and completed fertility depends on the levels of recuperation 
of postponed births. Thus, the implications of postponement on completed fertility are most 
severe if postponement leads to foregone births due to the fact that older mothers face higher 
                                                            
58
 There are two components of period fertility: quantum, which is underlying fertility and tempo, which 
captures changes in the timing of births (Testa et al., 2011). 
59
 The TFR, the most used measure of quantum fertility, is affected by a change in the timing of births. 
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risks of reduced fecundity,60  infertility and childlessness (Leridon, 2010). Interestingly a 
study of European Union member states by Nimwegen, Erf and Heering (2009) estimate that 
an arrest in postponement would raise completed cohort fertility by 10%. However, the 
correlation between increasing average age at first birth and declining completed fertility 
does not hold in all cases, with countries such as Denmark and France observing later ages to 
childbearing but strong recuperation (Bratti & Tatsiramos, 2010; Testa, Sobotka & Morgan, 
2011).  
 
Recently in Europe, there have been some signs of fertility recovery or stabilisation, although 
there are differential effects across countries (Hoorens et al., 2011).61 It is suggested that 
differences in family-policy provisions across countries may be driving the differential 
fertility outcome (Kwalwij, 2010). The extent to which policy has affected fertility rates in 
Europe over this period are uncertain, complicated by policy interventions not being uniform, 
and the stabilisation of a decline in fertility rates at younger maternal ages (Hoorens et al., 
2011). 
 
Fertility behaviour is a function of the direct costs of children, but also the opportunity cost in 
terms of loss of income, career progression and/or education (capital investment) possibilities 
due to childbearing (Bhrolchain, 2012; Kohler, Billari & Ortega, 2002; Mills, Rindfuss, 
McDonald & Te Velde, 2011). The interaction of these social and economic variables is 
complex. For example, rising female labour-participation rates, less gender specialisation, 
and higher human-capital investment and wages for women represents rising family incomes, 
yet a higher opportunity cost to childbearing (Ahn & Mira, 2002; Thévenon & Gauthier, 
2011). Women with strong attachments to the labour force can benefit by delaying births to 
                                                            
60
 Fecundity refers to the natural probability of a birth. 
61
 Bongaarts and Sobotka (2012) attribute the recent rises in European fertility to a slowing of the pace of 
fertility postponement, which is inevitable given the natural fertility age limits. 
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minimise the effect of forgone wages and foregone human-capital accumulation. Indeed, 
Miller (2009) finds that delay of motherhood leads to an increase of lifetime earnings of 9% 
per year; hence, higher opportunity costs to childbearing at a younger age is a key driver of 
postponement (Miller, 2009).  
 
As discussed in the literature review in Chapter 2, inference on the effectiveness of the Baby 
Bonus policy is not uniform (Lattimore & Pobke, 2008). While positive but small fertility 
effects were identified by Risse (2010) and Drago et al. (2011), papers by Parr and Guest 
(2011), Heard (2010) and Jackson (2006) raise questions about the co-incidence of 
Australia’s observed fertility increase and policy initiatives. Parr and Guest (2011) attempt to 
disaggregate family policy effects from socio demographic trends, stressing that Australia’s 
increase is not unique in the context of other OECD countries. They suggest that the 
contribution of the Baby Bonus to increased fertility has been small and that a range of socio 
demographic variables such as the interaction of age and parity, primarily structural tempo 
distortions, but also education, marital status, income and occupation were more significantly 
affecting fertility (Parr & Guest, 2011).  
 
Regional specific effects of the Baby Bonus have been analysed for NSW and Western 
Australia. However, the papers of Lain et al. (2009) (using NSW data); Langridge et al. 
(2010) and Einarsdóttir et al. (2012) (in WA) found conflicting effects on maternal age-
specific fertility. In NSW, while all ASBRs increased post-2004, the largest change relative 
to the pre-policy trend in births was found to be in teenagers, with proportionally the largest 
increase in women aged 30 and over (Lain et al., 2009). In Western Australia, Langridge et 
al. (2010) found no significant difference in response across maternal age groups. However, a 
more recent paper (with longer post-policy data) found that overall the policy increased births 
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rates by 12.8% and the increase was greatest in women aged 20 to 24 (Einarsdóttir et al. 
2012). This relative growth in birth rates to younger women suggests that the fertility 
increase does not predominantly reflect recuperation effects.  
 
To gauge the efficacy of the policy in influencing fertility, the underlying demographic 
context needs to be considered, which in turn can be influenced by the labour market and 
household perceptions of economic uncertainty. This analysis tests the proposition that an 
effective policy should affect all age groups simultaneously, questioning whether observed 
fertility changes may simply be momentum from past demographic trends. The most likely 
demographic trend in the context of developed nations is that of postponement and 
recuperation.  
 
5.3 Data and Method 
 
5.3.1 Data and Descriptives 
 
Time series were developed using VPDC data from January 1983 to December 2008 (N = 
1,671,774). The VPDC unit is a state-wide population surveillance system to collect and 
analyse data on the health of mothers and their babies. The data are collected via a birth 
report containing over 100 items relating to maternal and child health and demographics 
relevant to the perinatal period (i.e. 20 weeks gestation to 28 days post birth). Access to the 
VPDC data was subject to RMIT ethics clearance and approval by the CCOPMM. Key 
fertility-relevant macroeconomic indicators (female, male unemployment, female 
participation, state final demand) used as control variables are sourced from the ABS, as are 
female population estimates used to calculate birth ratios.  
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Household perceptions of economic uncertainty are captured using the Westpac-Melbourne 
Institute Survey of Consumer Sentiment. 
 
Victoria is among the fastest growing and more diverse societies in Australia (ABS 2012) and 
has been subject to postponement transition. The fertility rate over the past three decades has 
been noticeably below the replacement rate of 2.1 (as demonstrated in Figure 5.1), although 
in recent years, this rate has increased. While there is evidence of a slowing of the decline of 
fertility in the late 1990s and a stabilisation of fertility in the early 2000s, the observable 
increase in the Victorian TFR coincides with the period following the introduction of the 
Baby Bonus.  
 
 
Figure 5.1: Victorian TFR 
Source: Authors calculation using VPDC data and ABS-estimated Victorian annual population data (Cat. No. 
310104 2009).  
Note: Birth ratios for each maternal age were developed (i.e. number of births divided by the estimated 
population of women in that age category). To calculate the TFR, these monthly ratios were summed and 
multiplied by five; this figure was multiplied by 12 and divided by 1000.  
 
Given the temporal fertility measurement limitations of the TFR reported in the literature (Ni 
Bhrolchain, 1992) the data were stratified by maternal age, then births ratios were generated 
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using Victorian population estimates for women aged between 15 and 44 (ABS, 2010). The 
age ASBRs are defined as the monthly number of births to women of a particular age group, 
per (estimated) 1,000 women of that age group, and categorised according to the following 
age groups:  
• Group A: women aged 15 to 19 
• Group B: women aged 20 to 24 
• Group C: women aged 25 to 29 
• Group D: women aged 30 to 34 
• Group E: women aged 35 to 40 
• Group F: women aged 40 to 44 
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Figure 5.2: Victorian ASBR 
Source: Authors calculations using VPDC data and ABS-estimated Victorian annual population data (Cat. No. 
310104 2009). 
Note: The ASBR is calculated as the number of births to women of a given age category as a proportion of the 
estimated female population in that category. The straight line represents the point in time from which fertility 
effects may be observed (March 2005). 
 
In Figure 5.2, the fertility rates by age cohort are displayed. A visual inspection of the series 
reveals several key features following the policy introduction. First, there is a general 
downward trend in teenage births over the period and this does not appear to change after 
July 2004. It can also be observed that there is a general upward trend in those women aged 
40 and older having children, but this trend does not appear to change greatly after the Baby 
Bonus introduction. Following the policy introduction on 1 July 2004, the decline in the 
births per 1,000 of women aged 20 to 24 appears to slow. Historically, we can observe a 
growth in the trend of the series relating to women aged 30 to 34 and 35 to 39 but post-2004 
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this growth appears to strengthen. A slowing in the decline of births to mothers aged 25–29 
appears to have commenced in the early 2000s but there does appear to be a change in births 
in this group after the policy introduction.  
 
To formally test for post-policy introduction changes in age-specific fertility trends, a 
multivariate state space model is employed. The model, fitted to the data using OxMetrics’ 
STAMP 8.2 (Koopman, 2009), is referred to as SUTSE, a multivariate generalisation of 
standard structural time series models used in the previous chapter. State space methods 
provide a framework for the decomposition of time series into trend and seasonal components 
to identify the dynamics of the time series simultaneously (Commandeur & Koopman, 2007). 
By applying a multivariate specification, the dynamic interactions between the variables of 
interest, in this case age-specific fertility rates, can be appropriately captured.  
 
For an N-vector of ASBRs at time t, denoted as yt, the model takes on the form: 
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Equation 1 is referred to as the observation equation whereas 2a to 2c are denoted as the 
component or state equations. The interrelationships are captured through the N x N variance 
covariance matrices denoted as ∑ (Harvey, 1991). 
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The bolded characters denote N-vectors; here N denotes the number of the series. In 
particular, Υt denotes a vector of observations at time t (e.g. age-specific monthly birth 
ratios). The term Zt denotes a set of explanatory variables, while Xt represents the set of 
fertility change date intervention variables at time t. Two fertility change date intervention 
variables are applied, while a third captures discretionary birth-timing changes. The terms 
tt βµ ,  and tγ  denote vectors of trends, growth and seasonal rates at time t.  
 
The association between the series is captured by the off-diagonal elements of the various (N 
x N) ∑ matrices. The trend (equations [2a] and [2b]) is made up of two components, 1−tµ  and
1−tβ , where tβ  captures the growth in the series, and 1−tµ
 
the level. The seasonal component 
is captured in equation 2c. Both disturbances (εt, and ηt,) are assumed to be normally 
disturbed with a zero mean and constant covariance matrix. The disturbances are assumed to 
be strictly independent (Koopman et al., 2009). 
 
The coefficients Θ and Φ measure the direction and size of the explanatory and fertility 
change date intervention variables respectively. By including a set of fertility change 
intervention variables, it is possible to measure whether a departure from the underlying 
trend 62  in age-specific fertility rates coincided with the introduction and subsequent 
modifications in the Baby Bonus policy. The relevant fertility change dates are informed by 
the national-level analysis in Chapter 4. The explanatory variables capture macroeconomic, 
labour-market trends and household-expectation trends over the same period, and thus control 
for possible alternative reasons for contemporaneous fertility change.  
 
                                                            
62
 Note the underlying trend is a general term referring to the entire data-generating process as depicted by all 
equations of the structural time series model excluding the term ΦZt.  
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In addition to examining the data for changes in the trend, which may reflect long-term 
behavioural changes in fertility choice, a set of short-term birth-timing effects, relating to 
discretionary Caesarean sections are controlled for (Gans & Leigh, 2009). Outlier dummy 
variables capture temporary sudden increases in the value of the level. Short-term birth-
timing effects are captured by fitting outlier dummy variables to the time series observations 
pre and post the introduction of the policy, that is, June and July 2004 and June and July 
2006, when there was a substantial increment to the subsidy.63 Due to concerns about teenage 
mismanagement of funds, in January 2007 the Baby Bonus was changed from being paid in a 
lump sum to being paid in instalments for teenagers. Given the change in incentives, outlier 
dummy variables are included in the model in December 2006 and January 2007 to capture 
any short-run changes to timing of births for the teenage group only. 
 
The empirical analysis is developed in three stages. First, a model in which ASBRs are the 
dependent variables is applied, inclusive of fertility change date interventions. Second, an 
extended model inclusive of explanatory variables is assessed and discussed to establish the 
robustness of results presented. Finally, a quarterly conversion of the data is modelled as 
GDP-related data are only reported quarterly.  
 
While there are limitations on time series analysis to isolate causal relationships, primarily 
due to the inability to control a broad range of complex micro level influences on fertility 
choice such as education or cultural background, a consideration of changes in ASBR assists 
to separate policy effects from prevailing demographic trends (Bongaarts & Sobotka, 2012). 
Although it is difficult to establish an exact counterfactual, any slow-moving changes in 
demographic patterns are incorporated into the trend analysis and therefore, the methodology 
                                                            
63
 Insufficient data are available to test for a change in timing related to the introduction of means testing in 
January 2009. 
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ensures that the fertility change variables capture effects over and above slower moving 
demographic trends.  
 
A positive policy effect would be supported by an increase in birth ratios across all age 
groups but in particular younger women (McDonald & Kippen, 2007), whereas a cohort-
driven recuperation, co-incidental with the policy introduction would be evidenced by a 
significant increase in births to older mothers only. 
5.4 Results and Discussion 
 
Fertility-choice effects of the policy were initially modelled by fitting a structural break to the 
level of the ASBR series 10 months after the policy announcement. This fertility change date 
was informed by the national level analysis. Results are presented in Table 5.1. Interestingly, 
the initial fertility response to the policy (as captured by the level break in March 2005) is 
positive and consistent across all maternal age groups except teenagers.  
 
This implies that after March 2005, there has been a permanent and sustained increase in the 
average birth ratios of both younger and older mothers. To contextualise the results in terms 
of additional births, a significant level break coefficient of 0.42 for women aged 25 to 29 
suggests that after March 2005 there were approximately 72 additional babies born each 
month to mothers in this age category in Victoria. Indeed, the most striking result to emerge 
from the data is that there is a significant positive increase in average births for women aged 
less than 30 (except teenagers). These findings concur with those of Einarsdóttir et al. (2012) 
relating to the age-specific policy response in Western Australia. This suggests that fertility 
changes are therefore, not driven only by the momentum of past changes in behaviour such as 
the recuperation of previously postponed births. A clear pattern of change is also 
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demonstrated for the age groups over 30 years. Older maternal age groups exhibited a 
positive fertility change approximately 10 months after the policy announcement, as shown 
by a significant positive shift in the level of the series for these age cohorts in March 2005. 
For these older women, unless the move to an end of postponement is sudden and exactly 
contemporaneous to the policy related fertility change dates, we can interpret the findings 
above as policy induced, given that slow-moving changes in demographic patterns are 
incorporated into the trend analysis. 
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Table 5.1: Coefficient Estimates for ASBR  
 
†p <0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01 
Note: Outliers refer to ‘one-off’ departures otherwise referred to as impulses. Fertility change date interventions 
are the level and slope interventions. A level break refers to change in the (conditional) mean and the slope 
breaks proxy for changes in trajectories. The selection sample is 1983(1)–2008(12) T = 312. Series generated 
from data set N = 1,671,774. 
  
       
ASBR <19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 
       
Dependent variable ASBR ASBR ASBR ASBR ASBR ASBR 
Outliers 2004 (6) 0.02 –0.43* –0.07 –0.43 –0.39* –0.05 
 (0.80)  (0.04) (0.80)  (0.12) (0.04) (0.46) 
 
Outliers 2004 (7) 
 
–0.09 
 
–0.01 
 
0.08 
 
0.54† 
 
0.47* 
 
0.12† 
 (0.25) (0.95) (0.77) (0.05)  (0.01) (0.06) 
Outliers 2006 (6) 0.01 –0.05 0.08 –0.18 –0.10 –0.00 
 (0.88) (0.79) (0.78) (0.52) (0.60) (0.93) 
Outliers 2006 (7) –0.07 –0.04 0.18 0.40 0.06 0.13* 
 (0.38) (0.81) (0.55) (0.16) (0.75) (0.04) 
Outliers 2006 (12) 0.02      
 (0.79)      
Outliers 2007 (1) –0.09      
 (0.26)      
Level break 2005 (3) –0.008 0.18† 0.42* 0.43* 0.45** 0.06* 
 (0.87) (0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Slope break 2006 (1) 0.001  0.02**  0.02*  0.004  0.01† 0.006**  
 (0.72) (0.00) (0.04) (0.63) (0.09) (0.00) 
Slope break 2008 (1) 0.003 –0.02 –0.03 –0.03† –0.04** 0.00 
 (0.66) (0.24) (0.20) (0.09) (0.00) (0.49) 
R2 0.45 0.48 0.43 0.48 0.53 0.59 
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The 2005, level break coefficient (Table 5.1 line 7) representing births to women aged 40 to 
44 is smaller than that of the younger age groups but this may be due to the fact that although 
the fertility intentions may have increased in response to the policy, fecundity constraints 
may reduce the probability of a positive outcome or birth. 
 
The second fertility change variable applied is a slope break, which captures any change in 
the growth trajectory of series after the policy intervention. As in the national-level analysis, 
a slope break is fitted in January 2006 and January 2008. The relevant results are presented in 
Table 5.1 (lines 8 and 9). In 2006, cumulative growth in the series representing births to 
women aged 20 to 29 and 35 to 44 are observed. This suggests that in addition to the one-off 
permanent positive increase in the mean level of births as captured by the level break in 2005, 
there was also a significant monthly increase of births to women in these age categories. To 
illustrate this point, after January 2006, a positive slope break coefficient of 0.02 (as 
identified for women aged 25 to 29) would equate to an approximate cumulative addition of 
3.5 babies per month. The hypothesis that the policy has driven behavioural change is again 
supported by these positive cumulative growth in birth ratios for younger groups (slope break 
January 2006), the coefficients of which are greater than those of older age groups.  
 
A second slope break is fitted in January 2008. Significant negative slope break coefficients 
are identified for women aged 30 to 39 (refer to Table 5.1, line 8). It is interesting to note that 
this slowing of growth in the birth ratios of older mothers is not observable in the younger 
age groups after 2008. This suggests that the cumulative increase in total birth ratios during 
this period is driven by births to women in younger age groups; further supporting the 
hypothesis of policy-induced behavioural change. What is not clear is whether the slowing of 
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births to women aged 30 to 34 in 2008 (in particular those aged 30 to 34, slope break 2008) 
may be due to bringing forward births possibly captured in the positive slope break in 2006 to 
women aged 25 to 29.64.  
 
The discretionary birth-timing effect on the introduction of the policy exhibits some 
heterogeneity in response across maternal age. This birth-timing effect is found to be most 
significant in the older age groups particularly for women aged 35 to 39. An abnormal 
increase in births is observed in July 2004 for all maternal ages over 30. Although these 
increases are matched by a significant decrease in June 2004 for the 35 to 40 year old only, 
negative signs are observed on the coefficients of both the 30 to 34 and 40 to 44 age groups.  
 
These results would concur with the notion that women in these age groups are most likely to 
have higher rates of scheduled Caesarean sections65 and private healthcare cover and thus, 
may have more discretion around the timing of births. Interestingly a significant decline in 
June 2004 is observed for women aged 20 to 24 but again not matched by a significant 
simultaneous increase in July.66 The incremental rise in the Baby Bonus in July 2006 by $834 
appears not to have affected birth timing, although there was an increase in births by women 
aged 40 and older in July 2006. 
 
5.5 Economic Variables 
 
Economic variables are added to the model to control for the possibility that the estimated 
results could be affected by non-policy related economic factors (Adserà, 2004; Goldstein et 
                                                            
64
 This question will be addressed in the next chapter 
65
 A population study of Victorian women has found that older women are found to be associated with a higher 
risk of Caesarean section delivery (Biro et al., 2012). 
66
 According to a study by Robson et al. in 2009 the rate of Caesarean sections in Australia exceeded 30%. 
Maternal request is an important contributor to these rates (Robson et al., 2009). In 2009, 27.7% of women 
admitted as public patients and 38.9% of those admitted as private patients had Caesarean sections. 
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al., 2013; Hofmann & Hohmeyer, 2013; Huttunen & Kellokumpu, 2012; Kreyenfeld et al., 
2012; Sobotka, Skirbekk & Philipov, 2011). Although the analysis presented in Chapter 4 
finds that the economic variables were not significant across the total population, it may be 
that disaggregation across age groups shows differing results on the sensitivity of fertility 
choice to economic circumstances. 
 
To establish whether the results presented in Table 5.1 are robust, a second multivariate 
model is run subject to inclusion of unemployment and labour-force participation variables 
but also Victoria-specific household-sentiment variables (as captured by the Westpac CSI). 
Note the Victoria-specific CSI data are available only from 1996. The results from this 
second model are presented as Model 2 in Appendix 5A. In addition, a quarterly conversion 
of the data to test GDP or state final demand is also modelled and results from this model are 
presented in Appendix 5B. It was found that the results in Model 1 are robust and in 
particular, the level break in 2005 strengthens across age groups except for teenagers and 
those older than 40. The results also hold for the quarterly conversion to control for /state 
final demand.67 This is important because it supports the hypothesis that the fertility changes 
are policy induced.  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
An increase in fertility rates has been observed following the introduction of the Australian 
Baby Bonus in 2004. An analysis of ASBRs goes some way to disentangling the policy 
effects from prevailing demographic trends such as recuperation of previously postponed 
                                                            
67
 Refer to Appendix 5B for the coefficient estimates and diagnostics. 
74 
 
births, and to indicate tentatively whether the observed change in fertility reflects a change in 
cohort fertility rather than simply an intertemporal adjustment.  
 
The results show that all age groups except teenagers showed a positive fertility response to 
the policy. Behavioural change is suggested by a higher cumulative growth in fertility of 
maternal age groups 20 to 24 and 24 to 30, which is sustained past 2008 even as a growth in 
birth ratios of older age groups was stabilising. In summary, the results suggest that the 
policy may have elicited fertility behaviour change, which has long-term positive 
implications for population growth.  
 
This research helps to determine the effectiveness of the policy assuming a pronatalist policy 
motivation, but it should be noted that a differential effect across maternal age groups may 
have broader policy implications. In addition to controlling for demographic trends and birth-
timing effects, analysis of age-specific effects of the policy gives some insight into the 
‘welfare implications’ and potentially unintended consequences of the policy. There is a 
growing literature related to the health outcomes and risks associated with advanced maternal 
age (Biro, Davey, Carolan & Kealy, 2012; Kanungo et al., 2011; Seidman, Samueloff, Mor-
Yosef & Schenker, 1990). If the Baby Bonus were found to have an effect on maternal age at 
childbirth, it could have implications for child and maternal health. 
One limitation of this analysis is that although it is observed that there is an increase in births 
to younger mothers, and not simply older mothers recuperating previously postponed ‘births’, 
the issue of parity is ignored. Research is needed to determine further the effect of the Baby 
Bonus and whether it has encouraged women to commence childbearing earlier without a 
change in completed fertility. 
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Appendix 5 
Appendix 5ATable 5A.1: Comparison of Model 1 and Model 2 
Model 2 = Inclusion of Economic Control Variables 
ASBR ASBR <19 ASBR 20–24 ASBR 25–29 ASBR 30–34 ASBR 35–39 ASBR 40–44 
(Births per 1,000 females of 
given age category) 
Model 1 Model 2  Model 1 Model 2  Model 1 Model 2  Model 1 Model 2  Model 1 Model 2  Model 1 Model 2  
      
Monthly        
Dependent variable Coefficient                     
Outlier 2004 (6) 0.02 x –0.43** –0.46** –0.07 x –0.43 x –0.39** –0.31 –0.05 x 
Outlier 2004 (7) –0.09 x –0.01 x 0.08 x 0.54* 0.69** 0.47** 0.36* 0.12* 0.10 
Outlier 2006 (6) 0.01 x –0.05 x 0.08 x –0.18 x –0.10 x –0.00 x 
Outlier 2006 (7) –0.07 x 0.04 x 0.18 x 0.40 x 0.06 x 0.13** 0.12 
Level break 2005 (3) –0.008 x 0.18* 0.18** 0.42*** 0.40*** 0.43** 0.40*** 0.45*** 0.45*** 0.06** 0.02 
Slope break 2006 (1) 0.01 x 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.02** 0.01 –0.00 x 0.01* 0.01 0.006** 0.004*** 
Slope Break 2008 (1) 0.003 x –0.02 x –0.03 x –0.03* –0.03 –0.04*** –0.03* 0.00 x 
CSI Victoriaa –0.002* x –0.01*** x x 0.001** 
Victorian female 
unemploymenta x x x x x x 
Female participation ratea x 0.06* x x x x 
Male unemployment ratea x x x x x x 
Normality  2.00 2.01 0.52 1.54 0.93 1.16 1.98 3.07 15.83 6.74 2.31 3.23 
H (two-sided F test)b  
0.505 
H (96) 
0.7 
H (40) 
0.72 
 H (96) 
0.64 
H (40) 
0.59 
H (96) 
0.85 
H (40) 
1.64 
H (96) 
1.01 
H (40) 
2.1 
H (96) 
1.69 
H (40) 
1.63 
H (96) 
1.47 
H (40) 
DW statistic 1.91 2.22 1.91 1.89 1.77 1.78 1.92 2.07 1.91 1.99 2.16 2.33 
Q-statistic 25.11 18.15 19.81 29.48 28.71 25.64 36.16 31.29 22.18 31.96 28.65 29.32 
R^s2 0.45 0.58 0.48 0.58 0.43 0.5 0.48 0.56 0.53 0.6 0.59 0.67 
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.001 
Note: The critical value for the normality test (where null corresponds to normality) is 5.99 (χ2) (Koopman et al., 2009, p. 201); thus, indicating the residuals are normally distributed. 
The p-value for Durbin–Watson is 0.41, which indicates autocorrelation is not present (Harvey, 1990).; b-value in brackets indicates the degrees of freedom for the different models. 
The frequency of the data is monthly from January 1996 to November 2008.  
Model 1 = inclusive of set of fertility change date variables. 
Model 2 = inclusive of set of fertility change date variables and a set of explanatory variables t-12 months. 
Superscript a = All explanatory variables are lagged 12 months 
x = coefficients for model where explanatory variable were not significant and are not reported for visual clarity and are presented in Table 5a2. 
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Table 5A2: Model 2 
       
Dependent variable 
ASBR 
with Explanatory 
ASBR 
<19 
ASBR 
20–24 
ASBR 
25–29 
ASBR 
30–34 
ASBR 
35–39 
ASBR 
40–44 
Outliers 2004 (6) 0.05 -0.46* –0.11 –0.42 –0.31 –0.06 
 (0.51)  (0.01) (0.69)  (0.16) (0.13) (0.43) 
Outliers 2004 (7) –0.09 0.06 -.06 0.68* 0.36† 0.10 
 (0.21) (0.72) (0.78) (0.02)  (0.07) (0.18) 
Outliers 2006 (6) 0.05 –0.13 0.10 –0.32 –0.11 –0.01 
 (0.47) (0.46) (0.71) (0.28) (0.58) (0.83) 
Outliers 2006 (7) –0.10 –0.14 -0.04 0.42 -0.06 0.12 
 (0.18) (0.44) (0.89) (0.18) (0.76) (0.11) 
Outliers 2006 (12) 0.05      
 (0.46)      
Outliers 2007 (1) –0.11      
 (0.15)      
Level break 
 2005 (3) 
–0.02 0.18† 0.40** 0.52* 0.45** 0.03 
 (0.70) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.34) 
Slope break  
2006 (1) 
∂  0.01**  0.02*  0.005  0.01 0.005**  
 (0.83) (0.00) (0.19) (0.73) (0.11) (0.00) 
Slope break  
2008 (1) 
0.01 –0.02 –0.01 –0.03 –0.03† -0.00 
 (0.23) (0.14) (0.76) (0.32) (0.07) (0.90) 
CSI Vic _12 -0.002 -0.002 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 
 
(0.05) (0.77) (0.00) (0.82) (0.18) (0.05) 
Vic UE female _12 0.02 -0.05 -0.09 -0.09 -0.01 0.01 
 
(0.36) (0.18) (0.13) (0.24) (0.82) (0.47) 
Female 
participation_12 
 
-0.02 
 
0.06 
 
-0.08 
 
0.07 
 
-0.03 
 
0.02 
 
(0.13) (0.06) (0.14) (0.21) (0.52) (0.21) 
Male UE _ 12 0.01 0.02 0.05 -0.04 -0.06 -0.01 
 
(0.87) (0.58) (0.38) (0.57) (0.24) (0.52) 
R2 0.58 0.58 0.50 0.56 0.61 0.67 
DW 2.22 1.90 1.79 2.07 1.99 2.33 
Normality 2.01 1.54 1.16 3.07 6.74 3.23 
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Appendix 5B 
Table 5B.1: Age-specific Effects: Quarterly 
Coefficient Estimates and Selected Diagnostics - Quarterly conversion to control for 
state income fluctuations  
       ASBR ASBR 
<19 
ASBR 
20–24 
ASBR 
25–29 
ASBR 
30–34 
ASBR 
35–39 
ASBR 
40–44 
 (Quarterly births per 1,000 females of given age category) 
      
Dependent variable 
(ASBR)  
Coefficient 
           
Outlier 2004 (2) –0.13 –0.71* –0.05 –1.33** 0.03 –0.09 
(0.45) (0.07) (0.92) (0.02) (0.92) (0.39) 
Outlier 2004 (3) –0.15 0.04 0.18 0.35 0.33 0.16 
 
(0.42) (0.91) (0.76) (0.54) (0.41) (0.15) 
Outlier 2006 (2) 0.27 –0.23 –0.27 0.41 –0.66* 0.18 
 
(0.14) (0.54) (0.65) (0.49) (0.10) (0.12) 
Outlier 2006 (3) 0.09 0.45 0.45 1.30** 0.91** 0.25** 
 
(0.59) (0.23) (0.45) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Level break 2005 (1) –0.07 0.33 0.99* 0.75** 1.16*** 0.11* 
 
(0.63) (0.27) (0.06) (0.05) (0.00) 0.07 
Slope break 2006 (1) 0.01 0.16** 0.24** 0.12* 0.16*** 0.05*** 
 
(0.60) (0.00) (0.01) 0.09 (0.00) (0.00) 
Slope Break 2008 (1) 0.02 –0.18 –0.39* –0.42** –0.38*** 0.03 
 
(0.65) (0.16) (0.08) 0.03 (0.00) (0.34) 
State Final Demand 
% change (t-12) 
0.01 –0.02 0.04 –0.00 0.00 –0.00 
 
(0.35) (0.45) (0.34) (0.85) (0.51) (0.81) 
Normality* 24.15 0.56 1.69 0.17 0.02 1.58 
H(22) 0.78 0.83 2.09 1.16 1.69 1.63 
Durbin–Watson  2.28 2.09 2.17 2.03 2.21 2.94 
Q-statistic  
(q,q-p) 
8.68 11.75 12.90 12.40 7.90 49.00 
R^s 2 0.46 0.50 0.48 0.57 0.62 0.71 
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.001 
Note: The critical value for the normality test (where null corresponds to normality) is 5.99 (χ22) (Koopman et 
al., 2009, p. 201); thus, indicating the residuals are normally distributed. The p-value for Durbin–Watson is 
0.70, which indicates autocorrelation is not present (Harvey, 1990). 
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Chapter 6: ‘One for the country?’: The Victorian Case Study 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The analysis in the preceding chapters goes some way to assessing the effect on fertility of 
the Baby Bonus. A positive effect on fertility is supported by the significant increases in 
births across all ages but in particular in younger women. The increase in births to younger 
age groups suggests that the observed increases in fertility post-2004 are not the result of 
purely cohort-driven recuperation that happens to be co-incidental with the policy.  
 
One question that remains is whether the observed change in fertility simply reflects an 
adjustment of the timing of births, rather than a permanent fertility increase. While 
insufficient time has passed since the introduction of the Baby Bonus to measure the effect on 
completed fertility of all current childbearing cohorts (which means this issue cannot be dealt 
with comprehensively) an analysis of parity across specific maternal age groups is performed 
here to provide some indication of whether the Baby Bonus encouraged women to commence 
childbearing earlier without a change in completed fertility.  
 
In this chapter, the analysis presented in Chapter 5 is extended to model birth order and 
maternal age and order-specific birth ratios. This enables the policy effects to be evaluated in 
a number of ways. First, a policy-induced birth-timing effect might result in a time-relevant 
increase in births of a given order in younger ages, which is matched by a later decline 
(relevant to the trend) in the same or older groups or vice versa. Further, a significant increase 
in higher order births across all ages would suggest that the Baby Bonus induced families to 
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have an additional child that they may not have had without the subsidy. An analysis of parity 
across specific age groups can help to clarify the effect of the policy.  
 
McDonald and Kippen (2007) suggest that the principal influence on short-term fertility is 
the age at first birth and the flow-on effects to higher order births.68 Indeed, Jain’s (2000) 
analysis of birth-order-specific fertility rates in Australia from 1986 to 1999 demonstrated 
that the observed decline in total fertility from 1996 to 1999 was primarily driven by an 
increase in childlessness. Kippen (2003) identified an increasing prevalence of childlessness 
and one-child families as key contributors to the observed decline in period fertility measures 
in the 1990s. The delay and reduction of first-order and second-order births resulted in 
subsequent third-order birth fertility decline in the decade before the introduction of the Baby 
Bonus.  
 
The first analysis in this chapter identifies whether there is a differential effect of the policy 
across childbirth order. Given that the Baby Bonus represents a reduction in the direct cost of 
a child, and the marginal cost of each successive child may be assumed to differ, it might be 
expected that there is heterogeneity in response to the incentive across birth order. Second, by 
extending the analysis of Chapter 5 to include parity, the effect of the policy on age of family 
formation or age at first child, and subsequent higher order births can be explored. Given the 
pre-policy prevalence of a trend towards delay and the reduction of first and second births, an 
analysis of order-specific trends clarifies the post-policy effects, contextualising for 
prevailing demographic trends.  
 
                                                            
68
 Bratti and Tatsiramos (2012) find that the effect of delaying the first birth differs across countries, and by the 
level of labour-force attachment. Women with lower labour-force attachment who delay their first birth are less 
likely to progress to a higher parity. Due to an income effect, women with a strong connection to the labour 
market who postpone their first birth increase the likelihood of progressing to a second child.  
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The discretionary birth-timing effects are also modelled across birth order, primarily to 
control for these effects in the time series and to explore whether there is any heterogeneity in 
discretion of birth timing across given parities. The identification of the potential differential 
effect of the Baby Bonus across birth orders explores the role of public policy as a 
determinant of childbearing behaviour change. Analysis of parity-specific effects helps to 
identify and clarify patterns of family formation that may be influenced or changed by the 
policy.  
 
6.2 Background 
 
A recent paper by Holton et al. (2011) highlights the fact that there have been few studies that 
have examined differences in childbearing outcomes by parity. Parity measures consider the 
fact that the decision to have a child is often influenced by the number of children already 
borne (Corr & Kippen, 2006; Feeney & Yu, 1987; Hoem, 1993; Hoem, Prskawetz & Neyer, 
2001). According to Hoem et al. (2001), the two-child family remains the norm in Australia, 
and so the transition from a second birth to a third birth is in some sense the decision to have 
that birth deemed over and above the societal norm. Hoem et al (2001) states, ‘Third births 
represent a kind of borderline case between the number that … “everyone” has and the 
number that many feel they can abstain from’ (p.3). To this extent, exploring policy-induced 
effects on third birth related fertility patterns, captures the proverbial ‘one for the country’.69 
 
International empirical studies on the efficacy of family benefits often identify differential 
effects across parities. The linkage between financial incentives and fertility in Israel is 
explored by Cohen et al. (2007), who find subsidy changes were most significant for third 
                                                            
69
 In reference to the then Treasurer Peter Costello’s comment “You should have one for the father, one for the 
mother and one for the country” quoted in the Age, May 15 2004. 
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and higher parity children. Their analysis suggests that policies that lower the marginal price 
of a child are effective in raising fertility over a short time horizon (Cohen et al., 2007). 
Laroque and Salanié (2008) find that fertility is sensitive to financial incentives for the first 
and third births but not for the second birth (Laroque & Salanié, 2008). Milligan (2005) 
evaluated that the Canadian allowance for a newborn child represented 1.3% of a first child’s 
direct cost for years 1 to 5, 3.2% for a second and 30.5% for a third.70 Milligan estimates that 
the policy resulted in an increase of 9.8% in the probability of having a first child, 13.1% for 
a second child and 24.7% for a third or higher parity child (Milligan, 2005). Duclos et al. 
(2001) also find that in Quebec, family benefits provided a strong incentive to give birth to a 
third child.  
 
Guest and Parr (2012) apply a household constrained lifetime utility model 71  to try to 
determine an optimal birth sequence, given simulated variations in family benefits. Direct 
family benefits per child are expressed as a proportion of the cost of a child. The findings 
suggest that substantially large increases in family benefits can increase completed fertility 
from two to three births, with the first two births occurring earlier. In another paper, Parr and 
Guest (2011) suggest that observed fertility rises reflect socioeconomic and demographic 
trends. In their analysis, age and parity, and their interaction, are considered independent 
control variables, but no significant effect of the Baby Bonus on fertility is identified. They 
suggest that observed fertility increases are due to a recuperation of previously postponed 
births (Parr & Guest, 2011). 
 
                                                            
70The Canadian allowance for a newborn child was paid from May 1988 to September 1997. It paid C$500 for 
the first child, C$1000 for a second and for a third or higher child the payment rose from C$3,000 in 1988 to a 
maximum of $8,000 in 1992–1997. 
71
 This research was calibrated using HILDA survey data. 
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Lain et al. (2009) calculate NSW parity-specific birth rates by stratifying the female 
population by the number of children to which they had given birth;72  thus, generating 
estimated childbearing intensities. They found that after the introduction of the Baby Bonus, 
the age groups that had a significant increase in first births were limited to teenagers and 
those aged 30 to 34 living in metropolitan areas. There were also increases in first births to 
young women in rural areas. Stronger effects were identified for subsequent births. Second 
birth rates increased for young metropolitan women, while third and subsequent birth rates 
were found to increase for all age groups over 20 (Lain et al., 2009). In Western Australia, 
the greatest increase was found in young women aged 20 to 24, and women having their third 
or fourth child (Einarsdóttir et al., 2012). Risse (2010), observing changes in fertility 
intentions post the policy introduction found that in the year following the introduction (i.e. 
2005), women with a higher number of children demonstrated a greater increase in 
childbearing intentions. From 2006 to 2008, significant increases in the childbearing 
intentions of those women with few or no previous children were observed. An increase in 
both intentions and observed higher order births would suggest that the fertility effects were 
not only tempo in nature. 
 
Drago et al. (2011) suggest that tempo effects such as compression and announcement effects 
could be mediated by parity, wherein an initial increase in a given parity would be followed 
by a decline in the same (Drago et al., 2011). In this chapter, the post-policy fertility effects 
are estimated across maternal age and parity. As a result, potential policy-induced changes in 
the timing or tempo of births can be observed. Although childbearing intensities and parity 
progression probabilities are not calculated due to the absence of birth-interval data, the 
                                                            
72
 Refer to ABS(2010b) (Cat. No. 1285.0.55.001) for information on the number of children ever born. This 
information is collected every 10 years. 
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structural unobserved components model that is applied enables changes in key period 
fertility trends concurrent with the policy changes to be estimated.  
 
The empirical analysis to capture the age and parity fertility dynamics is presented in two 
stages. The first, a multivariate structural time series model estimates the effect of the Baby 
Bonus across all birth orders for women of childbearing years (i.e. birth ratios for those 
women of childbearing age having their first through to fifth child). Second, the post-policy 
changes in fertility dynamics across maternal age and parity, in particular for birth orders one 
to four, are assessed. 
 
6.3 Data and Methodology 
 
VPDC data from January 1983–December 2008 is used to generate the relevant time series.73 
Data were sorted according to birth order and age-specific birth order. Births ratios were 
generated using Victorian population estimates for women aged between 15 and 49 (ABS, 
2009). Where relevant, the age groups categories are 15–19, 20–24, 25–29, 30–34, 35–39,40–
44. Maternal ASBRs were generated for births orders one to four or greater. The time series 
generated are presented in the following section. 
 
To explore the parity-specific effect of the Baby Bonus, again a multivariate state space 
model SUTSE is employed: 
                                                            
73
 The VPDC operates under the functions of the CCOPMM. The VPDC is a population-based surveillance 
system to collect and analyse information on, and in relation to, the health of mothers and babies to contribute to 
improvements in their health.  
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This model mirrors that used in Chapter 5; in this case for an N-vector of parity-specific birth 
rates at time t, denoted as ty . The term Zt denotes a set of explanatory variables, while tX  
represents the set of policy and fertility change date intervention variables. The terms tt βµ ,  
and tγ  denote vectors of trends, seasonal and growth trajectories at time t.  
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6.3.1 Birth Order 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Victorian Birth Ratios by Birth Order 
Source: Authors calculations using VPDC data and ABS-estimated Victorian annual population data 
(Cat. No. 310104 2009). 
Note: Each series is calculated as the number of order-specific births as a proportion of the estimated 
female population aged 15–49. The vertical line corresponds to March 2005, the time from which 
possible fertility outcomes from the Baby Bonus is likely to be observed. 
 
The first set of time series presented show the ratio of births by order for all women of 
reproductive age (see Figure 6.1). Clearly, first births represent the greatest proportion of 
total births. It should be noted that the time series are not capturing childbearing intensities 
but simply the distribution of births by order across time. Time-specific deviations in trends 
in the series capture the incentive-induced changes in fertility choice across parity.  
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On observation of the series presented in Figure 6.1, first births appear to be growing prior to 
the policy introduction, possibly reflecting a recuperation of previously postponed births. 
Indeed, between 1995 and 2005 the proportion of women having their first child over the age 
of 35 increased from 5% to 10% (ABS, 2008).This growth appears to strengthen after the 
introduction of the policy. The positive fertility effect may not be limited to lower parities as 
there appears to be some increase in third and fourth births from 2005 onwards. This suggests 
that the policy did not simply induce a change in timing of the lower order children that 
couples perhaps would have had without the policy incentive. There also appears to be a post-
policy change in the series representing the ratios of those having second and third births. 
 
6.4 Application and Results 
 
First, the model is applied to the time series representing births of orders one to five for all 
women of reproductive age. To ensure consistency in the analysis, the intervention dates are 
informed by the national-level analysis and include those capturing possible discretionary 
birth-timing effects in June and July 2004 and 2006, representing the introduction of the 
policy and subsequent increment. A change in the level of the series is tested in March 2005. 
Delayed effects are again tested by the slope intervention in January 2006. As the policy may 
have resulted in increased tempo of childbearing such as an anticipation effect, where births 
rise due to bringing forward births, but result in a subsequent fall in the observed series at 
later dates, a second slope intervention is applied in January 2008.  
 
The results of Model 1 are presented in Table 6.1. The first interesting result to note is that 
the level break intervention 10 months after the policy announcement was positive and 
significant across all birth orders. In reference to the rhetoric associated with the policy 
introduction, and in the absence of other possible unmeasured fertility determinants, this 
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suggests that the policy induced a significant increase in first, ‘one for Mum’ and second ‘one 
for Dad’ births but importantly, third births or ‘one for the country’. The changes in fertility 
patterns suggest that more families were having a higher order birth or a third, fourth or fifth 
child than was being achieved prior to the introduction of the policy. The discretionary birth-
timing effect appears to be marginally significant for first and second births, with significant 
negative coefficients observed for June 2004 and positive but insignificant coefficients for 
July 2004.  
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Table 6.1: Coefficient Estimates and Selected Diagnostics: Birth Order 1–5 
Model 1   
Birth Order 1st child 2nd child 3rd child 4th child 5th child 
(Births per 1,000 females aged 15 to 49) 
  
Coefficient         
Outlier 2004 (6) –0.09 –0.08
†
   –0.02 –0.01 
  
(0.10)  (0.09) (0.96)  (0.14) (0.51) 
Outlier 2004 (7) 0.07 0.04 0.04 –0.01 0.01 
  
(0.17) (0.28) (0.16) (0.55)  (0.12) 
Outlier 2006 (6) –0.04  –0.01   
  
(0.43) (0.85) (0.54) (0.99) (0.90) 
Outlier 2006 (7) 0.03 0.09* 0.01 – –0.01 
  
(0.55) (0.05) (0.66) (0.94) (0.52) 
Level break 2005 (3) 0.08* 0.07 ** 0.05** 0.02** 0.01* 
  
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Slope break 2006 (1) 0.003 0.004** 0.01** –  
  
(0.19) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.21) 
Slope Break 2008 (1)  –0.01** –0.01**   
  
(0.60) (0.00) (0.04) (0.86) (0.89) 
Normality* 7.96 1.76 0.62 4.56 1.88 
H: df (97) 0.73 0.80 0.80 0.42 0.94 
Durbin–Watson statistic 1.90 1.74 1.86 1.98 2.01 
Q-statistic 38.31 67.49 32.94 20.20 29.48 
R2 0.41 0.41 0.48 0.51 0.50 
†p<0.10; *p <0.05; **p <0.01 
 represents a minute quantity <0.001 
Note: The critical value for the normality test (where null corresponds to normality) is 5.99 (χ22) (Koopman et 
al., 2009, p. 201); thus, indicating the residuals are normally distributed. The p-value for Durbin–Watson is 
0.41, which indicates autocorrelation is not present (Harvey, 1990). 
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6.4.1 Birth Order by Age Cohort 
 
Age of commencement of childbearing is an important indicator of future fertility levels. 
Many women have intentions to have at least one child, and if this child is postponed, it is 
most likely to be recuperated at a later age.74 If women have their first child earlier, it can 
increase the probability of progressing to second or higher order parity. Gray, Evans 
Anderson and Kippen (2010) apply a split-populations survival time model to HILDA data 
and find that “the maternal age at first birth is strongly associated with the propensity to have 
another child and the speed of progression”. (Gray, Evans, Anderson, & Kippen, 2010, p. 
275).  
 
 In the absence of a policy intervention, assuming the rate of childlessness remains stable, if 
there were a decline in first births to women in the younger age cohorts, it would be expected 
that first births would be rising in older age groups. This postponement of first births can be 
observed in the series in the pre-policy period presented in Figure 6.2. From 1983, there is a 
general downward trend in first births to women younger than 25 years of age, while there is 
a corresponding increase in women having their first birth when older than 30 years of age. 
This decline in first births for women aged 20 to 24 appears to start to slow in the early 
2000s, prior to the policy. However, after the introduction of the policy, first births to 
younger women appears to grow, while the growth in first births to older women flattens out.  
  
                                                            
74
 According to Productivity Commission calculations based on waves 1–6 of HILDA in 2001, 16.3% of the 
1980 cohort expected to be childless, while in 2006, 13.8% expected to be childless. The desire to have more 
children declines with age and parity. (Lattimore and Pobke 2008)  
90 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Victorian ASBR for First Child 
Source: Authors calculations using VPDC data and ABS-estimated Victorian annual population data (Cat. No. 
310104 2009).  
Note: Each series represents the number of first births as a proportion of the estimated Victorian female 
population in each age category. 
 
To formally test for policy-relevant changes in fertility patterns on first births and age at first 
birth, the multivariate model is applied to the generated time series of first births across 
maternal age from 1983 to 2008 (as shown in Figure 6.2). Again, the model includes birth 
timing and fertility change date interventions. The results are presented in Table 6.2. 
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Table 6.2: First Child by Age Cohort: Coefficient Estimates and Selected Diagnostics 
First births 
ASBR: 1st births ASBR 
<19 
ASBR 
20–24 
ASBR 
25–29 
ASBR 
30–34 
ASBR 
35–39 
ASBR 
40–44 
(First births per 1,000 females)           
Coefficient 
Outlier 2004 (6) 0.01 –0.32* 0.00  –0.27† –0.06 0.01 
(0.82)  (0.04) (0.97)  (0.06) (0.42) (0.54) 
Outlier 2004 (7) –0.10 0.05 –0.03 0.37* 0.14† 0.05 
 
(0.19) (0.73) (0.84) (0.01)  (0.09) (0.11) 
Outlier 2006 (6) 0.01 –0.13 0.12 –0.20 –0.07 –0.01 
 
(0.88) (0.39) (0.50) (0.17) (0.42) (0.78) 
Outlier 2006 (7) –0.07 –0.01 0.06 0.11 0.16† –0.05† 
 
(0.38) (0.93) (0.74) (0.42) (0.06) (0.07) 
Level B 2005 (3) –0.01 0.09 0.07 0.15* 0.17** 0.03* 
 
(0.69) (0.20) (0.54) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) 
Slope B 2006 (1)  0.01† 0.01  – – 0.001* 
 
(0.65) (0.06) (0.21) (0.43) (0.89) (0.03) 
Slope B 2008 (1) – – –0.01 –0.01 –  
 
(0.74) (0.92) (0.63) (0.34) (0.90) (0.96) 
Normality* 1.13 0.20 3.08 0.79 9.24 15.23 
H df (96) 0.61 0.65 0.70 2.18 3.74 2.37 
Durbin–Watson  1.97 1.83 1.97 2.06 2.11 1.94 
Q-statistic 18.01 24.58 27.61 17.36 24.65 11.11 
R2 0.47 0.47 0.43 0.53 0.51 0.56 
† p <0.10; *p <0.05; **p <0.01 
 represents a minute quantity <0.001 
Note: The critical value for the normality test (where null corresponds to normality) is 5.99 (χ22) (Koopman et 
al., 2009, p. 201); thus, indicating the residuals are normally distributed. The p-value for Durbin–Watson is 
0.41, which indicates autocorrelation is not present (Harvey, 1990). 
 
The results show that there was an increase in the overall monthly average of first births to 
women over 30 as indicated by the significant and positive level break (2005) in the series for 
women of these ages. Importantly, a positive growth in the trajectory of first births to 
younger women is captured by a significant slope break to women aged 20–24. Although this 
co-efficient is small it represent a cumulative growth in first births to women aged 20-24 of 
approximately 1.75 babies a month, thus by January 2007 and additional 20 babies a month 
with this cumulative increase continuing to the end of the observed period. A significant 
decrease in first births was not captured in the slope break coefficients of January 2008, 
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suggesting that this increase was not simply a one-off change in the timing of first births in 
response to the policy.  
 
To explore further the effect of the policy on the extension of family size and whether the 
fertility patterns suggest the policy induced a move to higher order children, the model is 
applied separately to the ASBR for birth orders 2 to 4. For births orders greater than one, the 
model is applied to maternal ages older than 20 due to the small number of higher order 
births to teenage groups.  
 
Table 6.3 presents coefficient estimates for the fertility change intervention variables for each 
birth order 1 to 4 across age cohort. A full set of results relating to each birth order by age 
cohort are presented in Appendix 6. The application of the fertility change date variables 
show a significant increase in the level for second-order births to women aged 25 to 29 and 
35 to 39 as presented in panel two of Table 6.2. In addition, there was a positive slope break 
indicating a cumulative growth in second births to those aged 20 to 24 and 35 to 39 in 2006. 
Although third and fourth births are not the principal contributors to overall fertility rates, the 
increase in higher order births in conjunction with the policy introduction is interesting. In 
2005, significant level breaks indicate increases in average monthly third and fourth birth 
ratios across all ages except 25 to 29 for third births and 20 to 24 for fourth births. This 
permanent increase in the underlying mean of the series across maternal age suggests that the 
Baby Bonus induced families to have an additional child they may otherwise not have had, as 
opposed to the increase being the result of a tempo effect.  
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Table 6.3: Age-specific Fertility Changes by Birth Order and Age Cohort 
  
ASBR <19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 
Birth order 
 
ASBR  ASBR ASBR ASBR ASBR ASBR 
First births LB 2005 (3) –0.018 0.094 0.070 0.151* 0.169** 0.026 † 
(0.69) (0.20) (0.54) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) 
SB 2006 (1) 0.001  0.010†  0.005 –0.003  – 0.001* 
(0.65) (0.06) (0.21) (0.43) (0.89) (0.03) 
 
SB 2008 (1) 0.002  –0.001  –0.013 –0.011 –  
  
(0.74) (0.92) (0.63) (0.34) (0.90) (0.96) 
Second births LB 2005 (3) 0.004  0.046 0.187* 0.098 0.160** 0.006 
(0.76) (0.41) (0.01) (0.26) (0.00) (0.60) 
SB 2006 (1)  0.007†  0.005  0.008** 0.002* 
(0.79) (0.07) (0.26) (0.94) (0.00) (0.00) 
SB 2008 (1) 0.002  –0.010 –0.013 –0.007 –0.029** –0.002 
(0.52) (0.25) (0.25) (0.60) (0.00) (0.25) 
Third births LB 2005 (3) n/a 0.004†  0.035 0.086 0.111** 0.017* 
  
 
(0.08) (0.20) (0.12) (0.00) (0.05) 
 
SB 2006 (1) n/a – 0.001 0.005 0.004** 0.001 
 
(0.67) (0.37) (0.15) (0.00) (0.13) 
SB 2008 (1) n/a –  0.001  –0.016† –0.013* 0.001 
  
 
(0.36) (0.97) (0.07) (0.01) (0.32) 
Fourth births LB 2005 (3) n/a 0.008 0.091** 0.138** 0.060* 0.024† 
 
(0.35) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.08) 
 
SB 2006 (1) n/a  0.001 0.001 0.003* 0.001 
  
 
(0.62) (0.33) (0.50) (0.04) (0.20) 
  SB 2008 (1) n/a - –0.003  0.002  0.001 0.004 
  
 
(0.69) (0.41) (0.68) (0.74) (0.11) 
Rs^2 1st  
births  0.49 0.48 0.43 0.48 0.53 0.59 
Rs^2 2nd 
births  0.50 0.44 0.50 0.48 0.51 0.59 
Rs^2 3rd 
births   n/a 0.58 0.50 0.49 0.52 0.53 
Rs^2 4th 
births  n/a 0.53 0.54 0.52 0.53 0.51 
†p <0.10 * p<0.05 **p <0.001  
 represents a minute quantity <0.001 
Note: LB refers to level breaks, which are changes in the (conditional) mean; SB refers to slope breaks, which 
indicate a change in the trajectory of a series. Sample: 1983(1)–2008(12); T = 312. Series-generated from data 
sample N = 1,671,774. Refer to Appendix 6B for a complete set of model diagnostics. 
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The results suggest that family expansion is more responsive to the Baby Bonus than is 
family formation. The delayed positive fertility effect for the first child (with no significant 
immediate level shift for first births to women younger than 30) may be due to time factors 
attached to key determinants of family formation, including marriage and housing stability. A 
significant level change for second births to those aged 25 to 29 suggests that the policy may 
have encouraged younger mothers to progress to a higher parity.  
 
6.5 Economic Variables 
 
Analysis of individual maternal education and labour-force characteristics are beyond the 
scope of this thesis; however, fluctuations in key macroeconomic and labour force indicators 
are controlled for with the inclusion of explanatory variables. The explanatory variables 
included are total Victorian unemployment, female participation rates and the CSI. All 
explanatory variables are lagged 12 months, reflecting economic circumstances concurrent 
with the timing of a fertility decision. The explanatory variables are included in each model 
capturing changing fertility dynamics across maternal age and birth orders one to four. 
Results are presented in Appendix 6. 
 
The fertility change intervention variables observed in summary Table 6.3 were found to hold 
with some minor changes (+ and –) in the strength of the significant coefficients. 
Interestingly, for higher order births, unemployment was found to be significant and negative 
to younger women, while positive and significant for women aged over 40. This perhaps 
reflects the relative difference in the strength of income and substitution effects across 
maternal age groups for those marginal higher order births. A similar effect was noted for 
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female participation, with a change in sign from a negative to a positive coefficient from 
youngest to oldest.75  
 
6.6 Discussion 
 
Incentives matter in fertility decision making. The fertility pattern changes co-incidental with 
the policy introduction show a positive impact on the level of first births to women over 30, a 
growth in first births to women aged 20 to 24 from 2006, and family expansion across all 
maternal ages. 
 
There is some evidence that the policy induced effects similar to those simulated by Guest 
and Parr (2012), wherein the policy increased third births with the first two occurring earlier. 
This Victorian case study presents results similar to those found by Lain et al. (2009) in NSW 
where stronger policy effects were identified for subsequent births. However, Risse’s (2010) 
observation that the childbearing intentions of women with few or no children increased is 
supported by the increase in first births, particularly to those over 30. A positive slope break 
in 2006 in ratios of women aged younger than 30, having a first or second child suggests a 
more delayed response to the policy by younger women.  
 
Younger women who are developing their human capital through higher education and/or a 
strong connection with the labour force face a higher marginal opportunity cost to 
childbearing, through loss of human-capital accumulation, career development and income 
(Drago et al 2010). As a result, they may be less likely to be immediately responsive to the 
Baby Bonus incentive as captured by the insignificant level shift in first births to women 
                                                            
75
 For a discussion on trends in the differentials of mothers’ workforce participation refer to Bratti and 
Tatsiramos (2010), Ní Bhrolcháin and Beaujouan (2012), and Parr (2012).  
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younger than 30. Possible interpretations of the increase in third births to women aged 20 to 
24 may be that they face a lower opportunity cost of expanding a family, as they are 
potentially already out of the labour force and rearing children. 76  Those women who 
commenced childbearing at very younger ages are more likely to have a lower connection 
with the workforce, having postponed higher education or human-capital investment. The 
marginal benefit of the Baby Bonus will appear more attractive to them. Indeed, the ABS 
social trends (2010) found clear associations between socioeconomic status and fertility. 
They identified a contrasting age contribution, wherein women living in the least advantaged 
areas had their babies younger than those living in advantaged areas, so while there may be 
relative homogeneity in response to the policy across maternal age, there maybe 
heterogeneity in the underlying maternal characteristics such as education and socioeconomic 
status.  
 
Particularly important is the fact that the observed increases in births to a given age cohort (as 
presented in Chapter 5) when disaggregated across birth order, do not appear to have a 
corresponding decline in a specific birth order at the later fertility change date in 2008. To 
illustrate, the growth in first births to women aged 20 to 24 is not matched by a decline in 
first births either to those aged 20 to 24 or 25 to 29. This suggests that the estimated fertility 
changes to younger women demonstrated in Chapter 5 are not simply a compression of births 
across age cohorts but suggest that the policy induced a quantum effect. 
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 It also possible that younger women may not have accumulated adequate earning potential to cover full-time 
childcare. 
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Appendix 6 
Appendix 6A 
 
 
Figure 6A.1: Time Series: ASBR for a Second Child 
Source: Authors calculations using VPDC data and ABS-estimated Victorian annual population data (Cat. No. 
310104 2009).  
Note: Each series is calculated as the number of order-specific births as a proportion of the estimated female 
population of that age category. The vertical line corresponds to March 2005, the earliest date from which 
fertility outcomes from the Baby Bonus are likely to be observed.  
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Figure 6A.2: Time Series: ASBR for a Third Child 
Source: Authors calculations using VPDC data and ABS-estimated Victorian annual population data (Cat. No. 
310104 2009).  
Note: Each series is calculated as the number of order-specific births as a proportion of the estimated female 
population of that age category. The vertical line corresponds to March 2005, the earliest date from which 
fertility outcomes from the Baby Bonus are likely to be observed.   
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Figure 6A.3: Time Series: ASBR for a Fourth Child or Greater 
Source: Authors calculations using VPDC data and ABS-estimated Victorian annual population data (Cat. No. 
310104 2009).  
Note: Each series is calculated as the number of order-specific births as a proportion of the estimated female 
population of that age category. The vertical line corresponds to March 2005, the earliest date from which 
fertility outcomes from the Baby Bonus may be observed.   
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Appendix 6B: Coefficient Estimates for Second to Fourth Births by Age 
Cohort 
Table 6B.1: Coefficient Estimates: Second Births 
      Maternal age at 
second birth 
 
ASBR 
<19 
ASBR 
20–24 
ASBR 
25–29 
ASBR 
30–34 
ASBR 
35–39 
ASBR 
40–44 
(Second births per 1,000 females)           
  
Outlier 2004 (6) 0.02 –0.12 –0.09  –0.11 –0.15 –0.04 
 
(0.43)  (0.24) (0.58)  (0.50) (0.12) (0.24) 
Outlier 2004 (7) 0.03 –0.09 0.14 0.18 0.11 0.03 
 
(0.32) (0.35) (0.39) (0.28)  (0.24) (0.34) 
Outlier 2006 (6) 0.02 –0.04 0.04 0.09 –0.08 –0.03 
 
(0.48) (0.62) (0.62) (0.17) (0.39) (0.37) 
Outlier 2006 (7) –0.11 –0.02 0.06 0.37* 0.01 0.14** 
 
(0.70) (0.83) (0.73) (0.02) (0.83) (0.00) 
Level break 2005 (3) –0.004 0.04 0.18* 0.10 0.16** 0.01 
 
(0.76) (0.41) (0.01) (0.26) (0.00) (0.60) 
Slope break 2006 (1)  0.01 † 0.01   0.01** 0.002* 
 
(0.79) (0.07) (0.26) (0.94) (0.00) (0.00) 
Slope Break 2008 (1) – –0.01 –0.01 –0.01 –0.03** –0.002 
 
(0.52) (0.25) (0.25) (0.60) (0.00) (0.25) 
Normality * 0.27 17.84 4.13 0.64 10.27 7.89 
H (97) 0.90 0.63 0.65 1.35 2.96 2.27 
Durbin–Watson 
statistic 
2.05 1.93 1.98 2.04 1.89 2.17 
Q-statistic 16.42 17.40 31.93 34.26 20.31 39.86 
R2 0.50 0.44 0.51 0.48 0.51 0.60 
† p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01 
 represents a minute quantity <0.001 
Note: The critical value for the normality test (where null corresponds to normality) is 5.99 (χ22) (Koopman et 
al., 2009, p. 201); thus, indicating the residuals are normally distributed. The p-value for Durbin–Watson is 
0.41, which indicates autocorrelation is not present (Harvey, 1990).  
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Table 6B.2: Coefficient Estimates: Third Births 
Maternal age at third 
birth 
ASBR 
20-24 
ASBR 
25-29 
ASBR 
30-34 
ASBR 
35-39 
ASBR 
40-44 
(Third births per 1,000 females)     
Outlier 2004 (6)  0.02  0.10 –0.05 –0.02 
 (0.70) (0.59)  (0.36) (0.50) (0.52) 
Outlier 2004 (7) 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.03 
 (0.58) (0.23) (0.68)  (0.19) (0.28) 
Outlier 2006 (6) – 0.09* –0.08 –0.05 – 
 (0.68) (0.05) (0.48) (0.50) (0.96) 
Outlier 2006 (7) –0.02† 0.01 0.01 –0.10 0.04 
 (0.07) (0.77) (0.93) (0.19) (0.14) 
Level break 2005 (3) 0.004† 0.04 0.09 0.11** 0.02* 
 (0.08) (0.20) (0.12) (0.00) (0.05) 
Slope break 2006 (1)  0.01  0.01  0.004** 0.001 
 (0.67) (0.37) (0.15) (0.00) (0.13) 
Slope Break 2008 (1) – 0.001 –0.016* –0.013** 0.001 
 (0.36) (0.97) (0.07) (0.01) (0.32) 
      
Normality * 14.39 0.60 1.46 2.21 2.55 
H (97) 0.72 0.62 0.95 1.90 1.94 
Durbin–Watson statistic 2.17 2.07 2.07 1.90 1.94 
Q-statistic 
 
17.33 
 
35.49 
 
28.32 
 
26.57 
 
20.16 
R2 0.57 0.50 0.49 0.52 0.53 
†p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01 
 represents a minute quantity <0.001 
Note: The critical value for the normality test (where null corresponds to normality) is 5.99 (χ22) (Koopman et 
al., 2009, p. 201); thus, indicating the residuals are normally distributed. The p-value for Durbin–Watson is 
0.41, which indicates autocorrelation is not present (Harvey, 1990). 
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Table 6B.3: Coefficient Estimates: Fourth Births 
Maternal age at  
fourth birth 
 
ASBR 
20–24 
ASBR 
25–29 
ASBR 
30–34 
ASBR 
35–39 
ASBR 
40–44 
(Fourth births per 1,000 females)      
Outlier 2004 (6) –0.01 0.03 –0.12 –0.10  
 (0.76) (0.62)  (0.17) (0.12) (0.96) 
Outlier 2004 (7) –0.01 0.01 –0.00 0.13** 0.01 
 
(0.60) (0.86) (0.95)  (0.05) (0.62) 
Outlier 2006 (6) – –0.01 –0.02  0.03 
 
(0.90) (0.82) (0.85) (0.96) (0.27) 
Outlier 2006 (7) 0.02 0.06 –0.10 0.02  
 
(0.45) (0.37) (0.23) (0.72) (0.94) 
Level break 2005 (3) 0.01 0.09** 0.14** 0.06* 0.02† 
 
(0.35) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.08) 
Slope break 2006 (1)  0.001  0.001  0.003*  
 
(0.62) (0.33) (0.50) (0.04) (0.20) 
Slope Break 2008 (1)  –0.003 0.002 0.001 0.004 
 
(0.69) (0.41) (0.68) (0.74) (0.11) 
      
Normality * 5.35 2.67 1.44 1.43 2.78 
H (97) 0.99 0.79 0.58 0.77 1.00 
Durbin-Watson  2.01 2.04 1.99 2.00 2.04 
Q-statistic 36.42 22.70 27.12 16.71 13.63 
R2 0.53 0.54 0.52 0.53 0.52 
†p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01 
 represents a minute quantity <0.001 
Note: The critical value for the normality test (where null corresponds to normality) is 5.99 (χ22) (Koopman et 
al., 2009, p. 201); thus, indicating the residuals are normally distributed. The p-value for Durbin–Watson is 
0.41, which indicates autocorrelation is not present (Harvey, 1990).  
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Appendix 6C: Economic Control Variables 
Table 6C.1: Coefficient Estimates for First Births Inclusive of  
Economic Control Variables  
Economic control variables 
ASBR: first births  ASBR 
<19 
ASBR 
20–24 
ASBR 
25–29 
ASBR 
30–34 
ASBR 
35–39 
ASBR 
40–44 
Maternal age at first birth      
 
      
Outlier 2004 (6) 0.02 –0.30*   –0.24† –0.06 0.01 
 
(0.75)  (0.04) (0.97)  (0.10) (0.46) (0.54) 
Outlier 2004 (7) –0.08 0.07 –0.01 0.40** 0.14† 0.05 
 (0.28) (0.62) (0.92) (0.00)  (0.09) (0.12) 
Outlier 2006 (6) 0.01 –0.12 0.13 –0.20 –0.06 –0.01 
 (0.86) (0.39) (0.48) (0.17) (0.44) (0.75) 
Outlier 2006 (7) –0.05 –0.01 0.06 0.11 0.16† –0.05† 
 (0.50) (0.93) (0.74) (0.49) (0.06) (0.06) 
Level break 2005 (3) 0.01 0.11† 0.07 0.15* 0.18** 0.03* 
 (0.91) (0.10) (0.51) (0.04) (0.00) (0.02) 
Slope break 2006 (1) 0.00 0.01* 0.01   – 0.001* 
 (0.77) (0.05) (0.27) (0.47) (0.85) (0.05) 
Slope break 2008 (1) – – –0.01 –0.01 –  
 (0.62) (0.78) (0.75) (0.58) (0.86) (0.87) 
Victorian unemployment_12 – –0.02* – –0.01 –  
 (0.34) (0.03) (0.99) (0.50) (0.29) (0.80) 
Female participation rate_12  0.01 – –0.01  – 
 (0.49) (0.71) (0.95) (0.37) (0.52) (0.74) 
CSI_12 –  –  – – 
 (0.45) (0.27) (0.46) (0.54) (0.96) (0.96) 
Normality* 1.56 0.79 5.16 0.73 7.55 6.77 
H (DF 92) 0.76 0.72 0.68 2.07 3.66 1.77 
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.97 1.91 1.99 2.13 2.11 2.10 
Q-statistic 16.7 26.72 28.15 19.47 23.80 20.30 
R2 0.49 0.49 0.44 0.54 0.52 0.56 
†p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01 
 represents a minute quantity <0.001 
Note: The critical value for the normality test (where null corresponds to normality) is 5.99 (χ22) (Koopman et 
al., 2009, p. 201); thus, indicating the residuals are normally distributed. The p-value for Durbin–Watson is 
0.41, which indicates autocorrelation is not present (Harvey, 1990). 
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Table 6C.2: Coefficient Estimates for Second Births Inclusive of  
Economic Control Variables 
Economic control variables 
Second births  ASBR 
<19 
ASBR 
20–24 
ASBR 
25–29 
ASB
R 
30–34 
ASBR 
35–39 
ASBR 
40–44 
(Second births per 1,000 females)      
Outlier 2004 (6) 0.02 –0.11 –0.07  –0.11 –0.14 –0.04 
(0.46)  (0.29) (0.66) (0.50) (0.13) (0.19) 
Outlier 2004 (7) 0.03 –0.09 0.16 0.16 0.11 0.03 
 (0.34) (0.38) (0.30) (0.32)  (0.29) (0.41) 
Outlier 2006 (6) 0.02 –0.04 0.04 0.09 –0.08 –0.03 
 (0.43) (0.65) (0.80) (0.56) (0.40) (0.38) 
Outlier 2006 (7) –0.11 –0.03 0.04 0.36* 0.01 0.14** 
 (0.73) (0.74) (0.78) (0.03) (0.96) (0.00) 
Level break 2005 (3) –0.01 0.05 0.18** 0.09 0.15** 0.01 
 (0.71) (0.41) (0.01) (0.33) (0.01) (0.60) 
Slope break 2006 (1) 0.00 0.01† 0.01  0.00  0.01** 0.002** 
 (0.87) (0.08) (0.26) (0.97) (0.03) (0.00) 
Slope break 2008 (1) – –0.01 –0.01 –0.01 –0.02** –0.002 
 (0.47) (0.35) (0.46) (0.69) (0.00) (0.14) 
Victorian Unemployment_12  0.01 –0.01 –0.01 –  
 (0.75) (0.21) (0.67) (0.36) (0.89) (0.16) 
Female Participation Rate_12 –0.00 –0.02* –0.02 –0.00 –0.01  
 (0.92) (0.04) (0.17) (0.92) (0.24) (0.37) 
CSI_12 – – – – –  
 (0.56) (0.71) (0.18) (0.70) (0.13) (0.14) 
Normality * 3.71 11.03 4.21 2.81 2.27 2.28 
H (92) 0.93 0.63 0.69 1.42 2.57 2.28 
Durbin–Watson statistic 2.04 1.99 2.10 2.08 1.91 2.19 
Q-statistic 26.95 18.86 29.05 32.31 21.34 42.50 
R2 0.52 0.47 0.54 0.49 0.47 0.59 
† p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01 
 represents a minute quantity <0.001 
Note: The critical value for the normality test (where null corresponds to normality) is 5.99 (χ22) (Koopman et 
al., 2009, p. 201); thus, indicating the residuals are normally distributed. The p-value for Durbin–Watson is 
0.41, which indicates autocorrelation is not present (Harvey, 1990).  
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Table 6C.3: Coefficient Estimates for Third Births Inclusive of  
Economic Control Variables 
Economic Control Variables 
Third births by maternal age ASBR 
20–24 
ASBR 
25–29 
ASBR 
30–34 
ASBR 
35–39 
ASBR 
40–44 
(Third births per 1,000 females)     
Outlier 2004 (6) – 0.02  0.10 –0.04 –0.02 
 (0.83) (0.55)  (0.36) (0.60) (0.41) 
Outlier 2004 (7) 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.03 
 (0.46) (0.19) (0.62)  (0.15) (0.33) 
Outlier 2006 (6)  0.10* –0.07 –0.04 – 
 (0.65) (0.03) (0.49) (0.55) (0.92) 
Outlier 2006 (7) –0.01† 0.01 –0.01 –0.10 0.04 
 (0.07) (0.74) (0.97) (0.19) (0.11) 
Level break 2005 (3) 0.01† 0.03 0.09† 0.13** 0.01* 
 (0.06) (0.17) (0.07) (0.00) (0.15) 
Slope break 2006 (1) – 0.01  0.01  0.01* 0.001 
 (0.74) (0.40) (0.15) (0.02) (0.11) 
Slope Break 2008 (1) –  –0.02† –0.01*  
 (0.39) (0.83) (0.09) (0.03) (0.57) 
VIC unemployment_12 – 0.01** 0.01 †  
 (0.49) (0.00) (0.46) (0.10) 0.80 
Female Participation_12 –0.001*   0.01 0.01* 
 (0.03) (0.80) (0.77) (0.44) (0.05) 
CSI_12  – – –†  
 (0.84) (0.15) (0.45) (0.10) (0.15) 
Normality * 15.68 1.71 0.86 1.67 2.90 
H (92) 0.80 0.66 0.86 1.41 1.43 
Durbin-Watson  2.29 2.07 2.04 1.97 1.97 
Q-statistic 28.33 32.26 26.79 29.86 24.68 
R2 0.60 0.52 0.50 0.52 0.53 
†p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01 
 represents a minute quantity <0.001 
Note: The critical value for the normality test (where null corresponds to normality) is 5.99 (χ22) (Koopman et 
al., 2009, p. 201); thus, indicating the residuals are normally distributed. The p-value for Durbin–Watson is 
0.41, which indicates autocorrelation is not present (Harvey, 1990). 
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Table 6C.4: Coefficient Estimates for Fourth and Greater Births Inclusive of  
Economic Control Variables 
Economic Control 
Variables 
Fourth or higher 
births by maternal age 
ASBR 
20–24 
ASBR 
25–29 
ASBR 
30–34 
ASBR 
35–39 
ASBR 
40–44 
(Fourth or higher births 
per 1,000 females) 
Coefficient 
(Prob) 
    
Outlier 2004 (6) –0.01 0.04 –0.12 –0.11† 0.00 
 (0.61) (0.51)  (0.15) (0.09) (0.99) 
Outlier 2004 (7) –0.02 0.01 –0.01 0.13† 0.01 
 (0.42) (0.82) (0.82)  (0.06) (0.69) 
Outlier 2006 (6) – –0.01 –0.02 –0.01 0.04 
 (0.90) (0.87) (0.80) (0.88) (0.26) 
Outlier 2006 (7) 0.02 0.04 –0.10 0.02  
 (0.53) (0.43) (0.19) (0.72) (0.99) 
Level break 2005 (3)  0.09** 0.14** 0.06* 0.02 
 (0.99) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.14) 
Slope break 2006 (1)    0.003*  
 (0.58) (0.28) (0.58) (0.03) (0.20) 
Slope Break 2008 (1) – –   † 
 (0.71) (0.47) (0.78) (0.86) (0.07) 
VIC unemployment_12 † –0.01* –0.01  * 
 (0.07) (0.02) (0.19) (0.27) (0.07) 
Female participation_12 –0.01†    – 
 (0.09) (0.80) (0.80) (0.37) (0.75) 
CSI_12     – 
 (0.68) (0.68) (0.40) (0.45) (0.30) 
Normality * 5.62 3.23 5.87 2.37 3.69 
H (97) 0.99 0.90 0.53 0.67 0.96 
Durbin–Watson statistic 1.99 2.03 2.07 2.08 2.01 
Q-statistic 34.38 15.43 21.45 20.53 14.90 
R2 0.53 0.54 0.52 0.55 0.51 
†p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01 
 represents a minute quantity <0.001 
Note: The critical value for the normality test (where null corresponds to normality) is 5.99 (χ22) (Koopman et 
al., 2009, p. 201); thus, indicating the residuals are normally distributed. The p-value for Durbin–Watson is 
0.41, which indicates autocorrelation is not present (Harvey, 1990).  
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Chapter 7: Contributions and Conclusions 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the principal empirical findings emerging from this thesis are summarised and 
the results are used to provide some insight into the effectiveness of cash subsidies on fertility 
choice in Australia. The chapter is organised as follows. The contributions of this thesis are 
highlighted in Section 7.2 and in Section 7.3 the principal findings are summarised. Section 
.4 describes the implications and limitations of the results obtained in this study and Section 
7.5 discusses recent policy changes and proposes an agenda for future research in the area of 
family policy and fertility choice. 
 
7.2 Contributions of This Thesis 
 
Three empirical contributions to the applied family economics literature are presented in this 
thesis. Chapter 4 investigates the significance of post-policy structural breaks in the time 
series properties of the national monthly birth-ratio series. The availability of five years of 
birth data following the introduction of the Baby Bonus allows for a more comprehensive 
review of the policy implications than exists in the current literature. The contribution of this 
chapter is to identify whether there was a positive fertility-choice response to the introduction 
of the Australian Baby Bonus policy and whether this response has been sustained over time. 
Nineteen years of national birth and macroeconomic data, beginning 1990, is analysed using 
an unobservable components model. The fertility change intervention dates are identified by 
employing a flexible break modelling approach and subsequently refined to minimise 
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residuals. Changes in fertility patterns post the policy introduction were captured by fitting a 
level break in March 2005, and slope breaks in January 2006 and January 2008.  
 
The research contribution presented in Chapter 5 addresses the possibility that observed 
increases in fertility in the years after the policy introduction may be a direct result of 
demographic trends such as postponement and recuperation. In addition, there have been 
questions raised about the drivers of the observed fertility growth and whether the policy has 
resulted in purely birth-timing effects or whether it has acted as a catalyst for behavioural 
change that will drive long-term fertility increases. Time series analysis of ASBR assists in 
disentangling these demographic effects and accounting for changing fertility dynamics over 
time. Data on all Victorian births from 1983 to 2009 were obtained from the VPDC and 
analysed using a multivariate unobserved components model: SUTSE. Trend function breaks 
modelled were those significant in the national analysis. This study of maternal age-specific 
policy responses begins to separate the policy outcomes from prevailing demographic trends. 
Importantly, if the fertility increase is driven solely by the momentum of past changes (i.e. a 
trend towards delaying births), this would be seen in particular age-specific fertility 
outcomes. Macroeconomic and labour-market variables, in addition to variables capturing 
household economic expectations, are controlled for.  
 
In Chapter 6, fertility dynamics were examined to identify whether the increase in fertility 
indicated a quantum increase in fertility or only a change in the timing of births. An analysis 
of ASBRs by parity is applied to unravel the policy effects from trends such as anticipation 
and recuperation, and to indicate tentatively whether the change in fertility reflects a change 
in expected cohort fertility rather than an intertemporal adjustment of the timing of births. A 
change in birth timing is inferred should an increase in a given birth order to a given maternal 
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cohort be matched by a corresponding decline at later date. A rise in quantum fertility would 
be indicated by an increase in higher order births, in particular third and fourth births.  
 
7.3 Principal Findings 
 
The main findings are summarised in the context of the research questions posed in chapter 
three:  
‘Do cash incentives affect fertility choice and, if so, is there evidence to suggest that 
incentives induce a permanent fertility increase over the period or simply a change in the 
timing of births?’  
 
The empirical findings presented in this thesis support the hypothesis that the cash incentive 
of the Baby Bonus positively affected families’ fertility choice. A positive fertility effect was 
identified 10 months after the policy announcement, which was coupled with a sustained 
growth in fertility trends between 2006 and 2008.  
 
Controlling for economic effects and population fluctuations, a permanent increase in the 
mean level of Australian births is seen in March 2005. A positive structural break in the slope 
of the series in 2006 indicates a cumulative increase in the birth ratios. A negative slope 
break in 2008 cancels the growth, yet the cumulative increase achieved prior to 2008 is 
sustained. It is suggested that the initial increase in births, recognised in March 2005, is a 
direct fertility response to the introduction of the policy and that the subsequent growth of 
birth rates may be the result of a delayed policy effect working through a number of channels. 
An estimated 108,000 births are attributable to the Baby Bonus over the period, at an 
approximate cost of $43,000 per additional child. 
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Positive fertility effects were sustained to the end of the observed period. An analysis of 
fertility dynamics across maternal age and birth order indicates fertility effects were not birth-
timing differences but sustained increases in the level of fertility.  
 
The power of incentives is also noted in the discretionary change in timing of births in June 
2004. The policy effect on fertility was estimated by considering possible alternative 
explanations for these timely changes in fertility.  
 
Some of the questions posed to address the possible alternative explanations are as follows: 
 
1a. Could the observed increases be due to past momentum of previous fertility 
behavioural change (i.e. postponement and subsequent recuperation)? 
 Is there evidence of a differential fertility response to the policy across maternal 
age? 
 Is there evidence of a differential response across birth order?’ 
 
In Victoria, all age groups except teenagers showed a positive fertility response to the policy. 
The fertility change patterns identified in March 2005 were found to be relatively 
homogeneous across maternal age. Policy-induced fertility outcomes are best captured by a 
fertility behaviour development across all cohorts, but particularly in the fertility patterns of 
younger women, as women younger than 30 are less likely to be recuperating previously 
postponed births. A sustained cumulative increase in births to women younger than 30 is seen 
from January 2006, suggesting that the fertility response was not just indicative of 
recuperation of previously postponed births. The slope break in 2008 was significant and 
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negative in the ASBR’s of women aged over 30, suggesting a slowing of growth in births to 
women of these ages from 2008 on.  
 
The discretionary birth-timing effect around the policy introduction was found to be highest 
for those women aged 30 or over.  
 
The predominance of tempo effects such as recuperation and anticipation of births are not 
supported by the birth order and age-specific birth order analysis. First, a significant 
structural break in the mean level of births across all birth orders, particularly higher order 
births are maintained until the end of the observed period. Positive structural breaks in the 
fertility rates of women having their third or higher child suggest the policy encouraged 
family expansion.  
 
Positive growth in the fertility rates of women having their second and third child was 
captured by the January 2006 intervention variable, yet this growth is offset from January 
2008. The birth order analysis was extended across maternal age to investigate whether this 
slowing of growth in second and third births indicated tempo related outcomes. Results show 
that fertility patterns are not due to a change in the timing of children by the same maternal 
age cohorts. When analysed across birth order, the growth in births to younger women is not 
matched by a corresponding decline in later years.  
 
The following questions were also addressed: 
1b Could the observed fertility increases be driven by macroeconomic or labour-market 
trends? 
 Do different maternal age groups exhibit differing sensitivities of fertility choice 
to economic circumstances? 
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Time-varying economic conditions can affect families’ fertility decision making. However, 
fluctuations in macroeconomic, labour-market or economic expectations were found to have 
little effect on the estimated fertility change intervention coefficients.  
 
At the national level, aggregate hours worked, consumer sentiment, female participation and 
female unemployment rates were not found to significantly influence fertility dynamics. The 
quarterly analysis which included the explanatory variables, female’s AWE and RGDP per 
capita, were not found to be causal factors in the observed fertility increases.  
 
In the Victorian study, consumer sentiment was found to have a significant negative 
coefficient for younger women; in particular, those aged 25 to 29. Positive consumer 
sentiment conversely had a small positive effect on fertility of older women, those aged 40 to 
44. The coefficient of female participation for women aged 20 to 24 was also shown to be 
significant.  
 
7.4 Policy Implications 
 
What can be deduced from the empirical analysis in this thesis is that policy incentives effect 
fertility decision making. The stated goal of the Baby Bonus policy may not have been 
explicitly pronatalist, but it has been implicit that the subsidy was designed to reduce 
financial barriers to childbearing and to encourage households to have ‘one for the country’ 
(Faroque, 2004). To this end, this study estimates the policy has been successful in boosting 
fertility rates, thereby affecting long-term population structures. As highlighted by Gauthier 
(2008), a direct causality between policy and fertility is difficult to estimate given the lack of 
a counterfactual, though this study goes some way  to exploring alternative explanations for 
113 
 
fertility increases and neither demographic nor economic trends adequately explain the timely 
fertility changes attributed to the policy.  
 
It is of no surprise to an economist that people respond to incentives, even for the highly 
personal decision of when to start a family and what the size of that family should be. What is 
surprising is the strength of the subsidy-associated fertility outcomes relative to the lifetime 
costs of child. When considering the effectiveness of a fertility-related cash payment in 
addressing structural ageing, the upswing in higher order births in the younger maternal age 
groups is of particular importance. An increase in fertility to younger women signals a 
behavioural change in fertility trends, suggesting that the policy may have acted as a catalyst 
in slowing the postponement of births.  
Table 7.1: Summary of estimated additional births across maternal age and birth order 
 
Maternal age 
group 
Level break 
2005(3) 
Estimated 
additional births a 
month 
Slope break 
2006(1): 
Cumulative 
change in births a 
month 
Slope break 2008(1) 
Cumulative change in births 
a month 
20-24 30 births 3.5 births - 
25-29 71 births 3.4 births  - 
30-34 76 births  - - 
35-39 84 births 3.7 births Less 7 babies 
40-44 9 births 1 - 
Total  270 from 2005 to 
the end of the series  
11.6 from Jan 
2006-2008 
-7 from Jan 2008-December 
2008 
Maternal age 
group  
With 
economic 
Variables  
Level break 
2005(3) 
Estimated 
additional births a 
month 
Slope break 
2006(1): 
Cumulative 
change in births a 
month 
Slope break 2008(1) 
Cumulative change in births 
a month 
20-24 31 births 1.8 births na 
25-29 69 births na na 
30-34 97 births na na 
35-39 86 babies na -5.8 babies 
40-44 NA 1 birth NA 
Total  283 additional 
births each month  
9.2 cumulative 
growth in births  
Decay in births of 5.8 births a 
month from January 2008 
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Birth Order Level break 2005(3) 
Estimated additional 
births a month 
Slope break 2006(1): 
Cumulative change in 
births a month 
Slope break 2008(1) 
Cumulative change in births a 
month 
1st  102  - - 
2nd  90 5.2 births  Less 13.35 
3rd  70 13 births  Less 13.35 
4th  26 - - 
5th  13 - - 
Total  301 additional births a 
month from 2005 to the 
end of the series  
18.2 from Jan 2006 
cumulative increase 
each month 
Less 26.7 a month from Jan 2008 
 
First Births by 
Maternal age 
Level break 2005(3) 
Estimated additional 1st 
births a month 
Slope break 2006(1): 
Cumulative change in 
1st births a month 
Slope break 2008(1) 
Cumulative change in 
1st births a month 
20-24 - 1.8 na 
25-29 -   
30-34 29   
35-39 32   
40-44 5.8   
Total  64 monthly increase in 
births 
1.8 additional monthly 
growth in first births  
na 
 
2nd Births by Maternal 
age 
Level break 2005(3) 
Estimated additional 
2nd births a month 
Slope break 2006(1): 
Cumulative change in 
2nd births a month 
Slope break 2008(1) 
Cumulative change in 
2nd  births a month 
20-24 - 1.8 na 
25-29 32.25   
30-34 -   
35-39 30.5 1.6 -5.6 
40-44  0.4  
Total  62.75 3.8 from January  2006 -5.6 from January 2008 
 
3rd  Births by Maternal 
age 
Level break 2005(3) 
Estimated additional 3rd  
births a month 
Slope break 2006(1): 
Cumulative change in 
3rd  births a month 
Slope break 2008(1) 
Cumulative change in 
3rd   births a month 
20-24 1  na 
25-29    
30-34    
35-39 21 0.7 -2.4 
40-44 3.9  -3.3 
Total  25.9 0.7 from January  2006 -5.7 from January 2008 
 
4th or greater   Births by 
Maternal age 
Level break 2005(3) 
Estimated additional 4th   
births a month 
Slope break 2006(1): 
Cumulative change in 
4th   births a month 
Slope break 2008(1) 
Cumulative change in 
4th   births a month 
20-24   na 
25-29 15.7   
30-34 27.3   
35-39 17.7 0.58  
40-44    
Total  60.7 0.58   
115 
 
 
In addition, changing fertility patterns indicate the policy drove an increase in higher order 
births to older women, suggesting the policy supported additional births across maternal age 
groups that may not have occurred without the payment. These findings have international 
policy implications, as governments may consider policy options to promote fertility in the 
face of ageing populations.  
 
It is acknowledged that time series analysis has limitations due to the level of aggregation 
implicit in the analysis technique. Indeed, it is not possible to control for all factors that could 
drive fertility changes over the observed period. However, the analysis does control for 
fluctuation in time-varying macro variables that might influence decision making.  
 
7.5 An Agenda for Future Research 
 
This study primarily focuses on the fertility effects of the policy until the end of 2009. Over 
this period, there were amendments to the policy in size and structure. By 2009, the subsidy 
was $5,000 but was subject to income-eligibility tests, limited to those families earning less 
than $150,000 per annum. Fertility growth patterns slowed somewhat towards the end of the 
series and potentially, the changing eligibility criterion and payment structure had a 
dampening effect on policy’s effectiveness. It may be that families are more responsive to 
lump-sum payments than instalments, which allow them to manage the immediate cash flow 
constraints associated with child birth more easily. More recent data are necessary to further 
explore these effects.   
 
It should be noted that since January 2011, Australia’s first national paid parental leave 
scheme has been running concurrently with the Baby Bonus subsidy. This scheme offers 
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eligible working parents up to 18 weeks of pay at the rate of the national minimum wage. 
Given the eligibility criterion of paid parental leave, it has been considered that the 2013 
reduction in the Baby Bonus is most likely to affect women who are not in the labour force, 
or those in casual employment. The fertility response to changing incentives across relative 
income groups would be an interesting line of future research. 
 
From 1 July 2013, the Baby Bonus was reduced by $2,000 for second and subsequent 
children. The Baby Bonus is set to be abolished from 1 March 2014 and replaced with a 
Family Tax Benefit payment Part A. The timing of the announcement of the abolition of the 
Baby Bonus in May 2013 allows couples wanting to avail of the policy, the time to attempt to 
do so. This may have resource implications for maternity services close to the cut-off date. 
For parents who expect a child close to March 1 2014, it may also allow for a discretionary 
change in the timing of births with parents moving births forward to remain eligible for the 
subsidy.77 The most recent proposed family policy change is the introduction of a generous 
paid maternity scheme to commence in 2015. The benefits proposed are expected to provide 
additional incentives to be in paid work until having the first birth and to return to work 
between children, potentially increasing female participation and connectedness to career 
progression, resulting in greater gender equity. Indeed, the structure of the payment is such 
that to be eligible, sufficient birth intervals are required and this could have effects on the 
optimal timing of children. In addition, it would be interesting to identify if the broad 
findings of  this research apply where competitor models are estimated. 
 
                                                            
77
 The effect of this would not be expected to be as great as that identified on the introduction of the Baby Bonus 
policy, as many parents can access the paid parental leave in place of the Baby Bonus and a family tax benefit 
payment will remain for lower income families.  
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Policy changes and more recent developments ensure scope for further research on the 
connections between cash incentives and fertility choice. The initial item on a future research 
agenda is to investigate the fertility effects of policy changes extending from 2009 as more 
data become available. In particular:-  
 
1) Can we say anything about the most effective method via tax and transfer system to 
stimulate fertility rates 
2) Is there an optimal cash payment and is this likely to vary across demographic/income 
groups 
3) Is there a way of undertaking a full cost benefit analysis (short and long run)  
 
Fluctuations in aggregate income variables were not found to determine a significant effect 
on fertility changes at the macro level, but this may be due to the level of aggregation in the 
absence of significant income fluctuations over the period. Given the limitations of time 
series analysis, a second line of research could take a cross-sectional approach. Variations in 
policy response could be explored across individual characteristics such as socioeconomic 
status.  
 
A control variable that appeared to influence fertility in this investigation was household 
economic expectations, as measured by the CSI. Analysis of economic expectations as a 
determinant of Australian fertility is another focus for future research. Finally, it would be 
interesting to examine the unintended consequences of the Baby Bonus policy such as 
‘quality’ implications (i.e. the effects on the welfare of children and mothers).  
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This study has observed that incentives can affect fertility decision making. The current study 
will form a solid foundation from which extensions to the family economics literature can be 
motivated and achieved. 
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